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Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.
  2. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2014. "Dissent in monetary policy decisions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-154.
  3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7718 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Ying Chen, 2015. "Career Concerns and Excessive Risk Taking," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 110-130, March.
  5. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2012. "When second opinions hurt: A model of expert advice under career concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-16.
  6. Partha Gangopadhyay, 2011. "Decision Making in Ignorance and Consequent Market Outcomes: Equilibrium Analysis," Modern Applied Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 5(3), pages 1-3, June.
  7. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.
  8. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2012. "Communication and Learning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 419-450.
  10. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect memory and choice under risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 127-158.
  11. Tomoya Tajika, 2021. "Persistent and snap decision‐making," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 203-227, February.
  12. Pavesi, Filippo & Scotti, Massimo, 2022. "Good lies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    • Filippo Pavesi & Massimo Scotti, 2019. "Good Lies," Working Paper Series 39, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  13. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
  14. Li, Wei, 2010. "Signaling drive over the long term," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 164-167, December.
  15. Li Hao & Wei Li, 2013. "Misinformation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 253-277, February.
  16. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  17. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
  18. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.
  19. Wei Li, 2012. "Well‐Informed Intermediaries In Strategic Communication," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 380-398, April.
  20. Dasgupta, Amil & Sarafidis, Yianis, 2009. "Managers as administrators: Reputation and incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 155-163, May.
  21. Chen Li & Uyanga Turmunkh & Peter P. Wakker, 2019. "Trust as a decision under ambiguity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(1), pages 51-75, March.
  22. Schmidt, Robert J., 2019. "Capitalizing on the (false) consensus effect: Two tractable methods to elicit private information," Working Papers 0669, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  23. Stefan T. Trautmann & Gijs Kuilen, 2015. "Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 2116-2135, December.
  24. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
  25. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2021. "Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  26. Aurélien Baillon & Laure Cabantous & Peter Wakker, 2012. "Aggregating imprecise or conflicting beliefs: An experimental investigation using modern ambiguity theories," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 115-147, April.
  27. Stefan T. Trautmann & Gijs Kuilen, 2015. "Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 2116-2135, December.
  28. Junichiro Ishida, 2010. "Vision and Flexibility in a Model of Cognitive Dissonance," ISER Discussion Paper 0771, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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