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The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850–1880

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Cited by:

  1. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/ismjpe8i38qaqpf7c0hldeicl is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Berg, Helene, 2018. "Politicians’ Payments in a Proportional Party System," Research Papers in Economics 2018:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  3. Stefano DellaVigna & Ruben Durante & Brian Knight & Eliana La Ferrara, 2016. "Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 224-256, January.
  4. Björn Kauder & Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Electoral cycles in MPs’ salaries: evidence from the German states," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(4), pages 981-1000, August.
  5. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Kermani, Amir & Kwak, James & Mitton, Todd, 2016. "The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 368-391.
  6. Kaisa Kotakorpi & Panu Poutvaara & Marko Tervio, 2013. "Returns to office in national and local politics," Discussion Papers 86, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  7. Martín Rossi, 2012. "Family Business: Causes and Consequences of Political Dynasties," Working Papers 114, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2014.
  8. Jeong, Dahyeon & Shenoy, Ajay & Zimmermann, Laura V., 2023. "De Jure versus De Facto transparency: Corruption in local public office in India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  9. Felix Schaff, 2022. "Urban Political Structure and Inequality: Political Economy Lessons from Early Modern German Cities," Working Papers 0225, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
  10. Berg, Heléne, 2020. "Politicians’ payments in a proportional party system," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
  11. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/ismjpe8i38qaqpf7c0hldeicl is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Lukasz Wiktor Olejnik, 2019. "Do coalition councillors grow rich faster? Quantitative analysis of asset declarations," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 18(1), pages 47-60, March.
  13. Jason Poulos, 2019. "Land lotteries, long-term wealth, and political selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 217-230, January.
  14. Gallego, Jorge & Prem, Mounu & Vargas, Juan F., 2020. "Corruption in the Times of Pandemia," SocArXiv js8by, Center for Open Science.
  15. Paul Vertier, 2018. "The Democratic Challenges of Electoral Representation and Populism: an Empirical Approach," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/7omfps2eu39, Sciences Po.
  16. Keith L. Dougherty & Grace Pittman, 2022. "Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 115-126, July.
  17. Dupont, Brandon & Rosenbloom, Joshua L., 2018. "The economic origins of the postwar southern elite," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 119-131.
  18. Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Cappellari & Maria De Paola, 2023. "The long-run earnings effects of winning a mayoral election," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def123, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  19. Berg, Heléne, 2018. "Is It Worth It? On the Returns to Holding Political Office," Research Papers in Economics 2018:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  20. Paul Vertier, 2018. "The democratic challenges of electoral representation and populism : an empirical approach [Les défis démocratiques de la représentation électorale et du populisme : une approche empirique]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03419534, HAL.
  21. Daniele, Gianmarco & Romarri, Alessio & Vertier, Paul, 2021. "Dynasties and policymaking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 89-110.
  22. Brandon Dupont & Joshua Rosenbloom, 2016. "The Impact of the Civil War on Southern Wealth Holders," NBER Working Papers 22184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Martín Rossi, 2016. "Self-Perpetuation of Political Power: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Argentina," Working Papers 127, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Aug 2016.
  24. Ahmed Tahoun & Laurence van Lent, 2016. "The Personal Wealth Interests of Politicians and the Stabilization of Financial Markets," Working Papers Series 52, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
  25. Heléne Berg, 2018. "Is It Worth It? On the Returns to Holding Political Office," CESifo Working Paper Series 7406, CESifo.
  26. Dahlgaard, Jens Olav & Kristensen, Nicolai & Larsen, Frederik Kjøller, 2022. "Reward or Punishment? The Distribution of Life-Cycle Returns to Political Office," IZA Discussion Papers 15274, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  27. Vuk Vukovic, 2021. "The politics of bailouts: Estimating the causal effects of political connections on corporate bailouts during the 2008–2009 US financial crisis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 213-238, October.
  28. Berg, Heléne, 2020. "On the returns to holding political office (Is it worth it?)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 840-865.
  29. Heléne Berg, 2018. "Politicians' Payments in a Proportional Party System," CESifo Working Paper Series 7278, CESifo.
  30. Ilona Babenko & Viktar Fedaseyeu & Song Zhang, 2017. "Executives In Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1762, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  31. Marko Klašnja, 2016. "Increasing rents and incumbency disadvantage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(2), pages 225-265, April.
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