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Family Business: Causes and Consequences of Political Dynasties

Author

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  • Martín Rossi

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres)

Abstract

I explore the causes of the existence of political dynasties in democratic societies. In particular, I investigate the causal relationship between tenure length and posterior dynastic success. Since tenure length is potentially endogenous in a model of political dynasties, I exploit a natural experiment in Argentina that provides a source of exogenous variation for tenure length. I find that having a longer tenure in Congress increases the probability of having a relative in future congresses. I also find that dynastic legislators have lower performance than non-dynastic legislators.

Suggested Citation

  • Martín Rossi, 2012. "Family Business: Causes and Consequences of Political Dynasties," Working Papers 114, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:sad:wpaper:114
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    File URL: https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc114.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Querubin, Pablo & Snyder, James M., 2013. "The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850–1880," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 409-450, October.
    2. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rossi, Martín A., 2014. "The impact of individual wealth on posterior political power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 469-480.

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