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Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension

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Cited by:

  1. Gregory DeAngelo & Gary Charness, 2012. "Deterrence, expected cost, uncertainty and voting: Experimental evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 73-100, February.
  2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
  3. Nuno Garoupa, 1998. "Crime and punishment: Further results," Economics Working Papers 344, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2009. "Public Enforcement of Law," Chapters, in: Nuno Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  5. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  6. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October.
  7. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
  8. Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2009. "Deterrence, Incapacitation and Enforcement Design. Evidence from Traffic Enforcement in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena 564, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  9. Marina Agranov & Anastasia Buyalskaya, 2022. "Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3573-3589, May.
  10. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2017. "On Punishment Severity and Crime Rates," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 464-485.
  11. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law," NBER Working Papers 9698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Chopard, Bertrand & Obidzinski, Marie, 2021. "Public law enforcement under ambiguity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  13. Ben-Shahar, Omri, 1997. "Playing without a rulebook: Optimal enforcement when individuals learn the penalty only by committing the crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 409-421, September.
  14. Numa Garoupa, 1999. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 183-196, May.
  15. Lana Friesen & Dietrich Earnhart, 2012. "Environmental Management Responses to Punishment: Specific Deterrence and Certainty versus Severity of Punishment," Discussion Papers Series 463, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  16. Zenou, Yves & Sommer, Marc, 2019. "Imperfect Information, Social Norms, and Beliefs in Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 14087, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018. "The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 21-32.
  18. D’Antoni, Massimo & Galbiati, Roberto, 2007. "A signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-218.
  19. Abatemarco, Antonio & Cascavilla, Alessandro & Dell'Anno, Roberto & Morone, Andrea, 2023. "Maximal Fines and Corruption: an Experimental Study on Illegal Waste Disposal," CELPE Discussion Papers 166, CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy.
  20. Dai, Zhixin & Hogarth, Robin M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2015. "Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 146-162.
  21. Buechel, Berno & Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2020. "Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 836-857.
  22. Jeffrey Wagner, 2021. "Optimal deterrence under misperception of the probability of apprehension and the magnitude of sanctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 2080-2088.
  23. Dietrich Earnhart & Lana Friesen, 2013. "Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 379-397, November.
  24. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Sheldon, Ian M., 2022. "“Enforcement of Private Food Standards: A Role for Self-Reporting of Non-Compliance?”," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322404, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  26. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Cheap Talk About The Detection Probability," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(01), pages 1-16.
  27. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June.
  28. Marceau, Nicolas, 1997. "Self-selection and violence in the market for crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 193-201, June.
  29. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-37, CIRANO.
  30. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2013. "A note on the non-maximality of the optimal fines when the apprehension probability depends on the offense rate," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 131-138, August.
  31. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson & Dietrich Earnhart, 2022. "The role of experience in deterring crime: A theory of specific versus general deterrence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1833-1853, October.
  32. Lars Hansen & Signe Krarup & Clifford Russell, 2006. "Enforcement and Information Strategies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 45-61, July.
  33. Bhole, Bharat & Wagner, Jeffrey, 2010. "Punitive damages and the recklessness requirement with uninformed injurers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 253-264, September.
  34. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 4078, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  35. Amartya Bose, 2020. "Racial disparities in law enforcement: The role of in-group bias and electoral pressures," Discussion Papers 2020-11, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  36. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.
  37. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
  38. Alexander Petre & Jeffrey Wagner, 2013. "Green Consumption under Misperceived Prices: An Application to Active Transportation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(1), pages 187-204, July.
  39. Robert Innes, 1999. "Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1305-1325, December.
  40. Heyes, Anthony & Doucet, Joseph, 1997. "2-Stage Enforcement and Regulatory Polarisation: a Simple Model with Application to the USEPA," Cahiers de recherche 9717, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
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