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The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2020. "The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 41-67.
  2. Elise S. Brezis & Joël Cariolle, 2017. "Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), State, Institutions and Democracy, pages 53-76, Springer.
  3. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.
  4. Vollmer Uwe, 2015. "‚Stairway to Heaven‘ oder ‚Highway to Hell‘? – Eine Einschätzung der Europäischen Bankenunion / ‚Stairway to Heaven‘ or ‚Highway to Hell‘? – An Evaluation of the European Banking Union," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 147-174, January.
  5. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Granja, João & Leuz, Christian, 2024. "The death of a regulator: Strict supervision, bank lending, and business activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
  7. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
  8. Lambert, Thomas, 2015. "Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from Banking," HIT-REFINED Working Paper Series 28, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  10. Silano, Filippo, 2022. "Revolving doors in government debt management," ILE Working Paper Series 61, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
  11. Lim, Ivan & Hagendorff, Jens & Armitage, Seth, 2019. "Is the fox guarding the henhouse? Bankers in the Federal Reserve, bank leverage and risk-shifting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 478-504.
  12. Koetter, Michael & Popov, Alexander, 2018. "Politics, banks, and sub-sovereign debt: unholy trinity or divine coincidence?," Working Paper Series 2146, European Central Bank.
  13. Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons‐Rosen & José‐Luis Peydró, 2021. "Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(3), pages 619-644, September.
  14. Buchak, Greg & Matvos, Gregor & Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2018. "Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(3), pages 453-483.
  15. Prachi Mishra & Ariell Reshef, 2019. "How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(2-3), pages 369-402, March.
  16. Reint Gropp & Steven Ongena & Jörg Rocholl & Vahid Saadi, 2022. "The cleansing effect of banking crises," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1186-1213, July.
  17. Rafael Repullo, 2017. "Hierarchical Bank Supervision," Working Papers wp2018_1718, CEMFI.
  18. Greg Buchak & Gregor Matvos & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2024. "Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(2), pages 616-693.
  19. Fabo, Brian & Jančoková, Martina & Kempf, Elisabeth & Pástor, Ľuboš, 2021. "Fifty shades of QE: Comparing findings of central bankers and academics," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-20.
  20. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2022. "Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1685-1736, June.
  21. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Beverly Hirtle & David O. Lucca, 2016. "Parsing the content of bank supervision," Staff Reports 770, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  22. Gong, Di & Huizinga, Harry & Li, Tianshi & Zhu, Jigao, 2023. "Goodhart’s law in China: Bank branching regulation and window dressing," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  23. Brian Fabo & Martina Jancokova & Elisabeth Kempf & Lubos Pastor, 2020. "Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research," Working and Discussion Papers WP 5/2020, Research Department, National Bank of Slovakia.
  24. Papadimitri, Panagiota & Pasiouras, Fotios & Pescetto, Gioia & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2021. "Does political influence distort banking regulation? Evidence from the US," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
  25. Puriya Abbassi & Rajkamal Iyer & José-Luis Peydró & Paul E. Soto, 2020. "Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review," Working Papers 1178, Barcelona School of Economics.
  26. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2021. "Talent Conceptualisation and Talent Management Practices within the Banking Sector in Vietnam," OSF Preprints y6r4q, Center for Open Science.
  27. Becker, Bo & Opp, Marcus & Saidi, Farzad, 2020. "Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Eliminating Capital Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 14373, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2020. "The European Commission and the revolving door," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  29. John Gallemore, 2023. "Bank financial reporting opacity and regulatory intervention," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 1765-1810, September.
  30. Rafael Repullo, 2018. "Hierarchical bank supervision," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 1-26, March.
  31. Charles-Cadogan, G., 2021. "Market Instability, Investor Sentiment, And Probability Judgment Error in Index Option Prices," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 71, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  32. Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021. "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 328-343.
  33. Donelson, Dain C. & Kubic, Matthew & Toynbee, Sara, 2024. "The SEC's September spike: Regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).
  34. Adams, Renée B., 2021. "Good News for Some Banks," Working Papers 311, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  35. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 22201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Jonas Heese, 2022. "Does Industry Employment of Active Regulators Weaken Oversight?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9198-9218, December.
  37. Adam William Chalmers & Robyn Klingler‐Vidra & Alfio Puglisi & Lisa Remke, 2022. "In and out of revolving doors in European Union financial regulatory authorities," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1233-1249, October.
  38. Kristin Wilson & Stan Veuger, 2017. "Information Frictions in Uncertain Regulatory Environments: Evidence from U.S. Commercial Banks," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 79(2), pages 205-233, April.
  39. Fotios Pasiouras, 2018. "Financial Consumer Protection and the Cost of Financial Intermediation: Evidence from Advanced and Developing Economies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 902-924, February.
  40. Gopalan, Yadav, 2022. "The effects of ratings disclosure by bank regulators," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1).
  41. Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons-Rosen & José-Luis Peydró, 2016. "Political Connections: Evidence From Insider Trading Around TARP," Working Papers 935, Barcelona School of Economics.
  42. Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from U.S. Commercial and Savings Banks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2545-2572, June.
  43. Barbosa, Klenio & Straub, Stéphane, 2017. "The Value of Revolving Doors in Public Procurement," TSE Working Papers 17-873, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2020.
  44. Sounman Hong & Taek Kyu Kim, 2017. "Regulatory capture in agency performance evaluation: industry expertise versus revolving-door lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 167-186, April.
  45. Mehmet I. Canayaz & Jose V. Martinez & Han N. Ozsoylev, 2015. "Is the revolving door of Washington a back door to excess corporate returns?," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1507, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
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