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Good News for Some Banks

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  • Adams, Renée B.

Abstract

Bankers are directors of Federal Reserve Banks. I document that a) banker directors of the New York Fed attend more meetings about the financial sector; b) elections for Reserve Bank directorships are more contested for bankers, but less so for large banks and American Banking Association directors; d) the market reaction to bankers' elections to Reserve Bank boards is 1%; e) the market reaction to insider purchases is 1.3% higher when banker directors are on a Reserve Bank board; f) Fed enforcement actions appear more moderate for banker directors. Reserve Bank directorships appear to be good news for some banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Adams, Renée B., 2021. "Good News for Some Banks," Working Papers 311, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:311
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal Reserve; Director; Banks; Conflicts of Interest; Political Connection; Reputation; Insider Trading; Enforcement Actions; Regulatory Capture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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