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Bank Chartering and Political Corruption in Antebellum New York: Free Banking as Reform

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Cited by:

  1. Eric Hilt, 2014. "History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, December.
  2. Howard Bodenhorn & Eugene N. White, 2014. "The Evolution of Bank Boards of Directors in New York, 1840–1950," NBER Chapters, in: Enterprising America: Businesses, Banks, and Credit Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 107-145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Umlauft, Thomas, 2014. "The Paradoxical Genesis of Too-Big-To-Fail," MPRA Paper 99301, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Qian Lu & John Joseph Wallis, 2015. "Banks, Politics, and Political Parties: From Partisan Banking to Open Access in Early Massachusetts," NBER Working Papers 21572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Stephen Haber, 2008. "Differential Paths of Financial Development: Evidence from New World Economies," NBER Chapters, in: Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth: Geography, Institutions, and the Knowledge Economy, pages 89-120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Sergi, Bruno S. & Qerimi, Qerim, 2007. "Fighting corruption and organised crime as a means of socio-economic development in south-east Europe," SEER Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 10(2), pages 81-94.
  7. Stephen Haber & Enrico Perotti, 2008. "The Political Economy of Financial Systems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-045/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Bodenhorn, Howard, 2008. "Free banking and bank entry in nineteenth-century New York," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 175-201, October.
  9. Howard Bodenhorn, 2009. "Splendid Associations of Favored Individuals: Federal and State Commercial Banking Policy in the Federalist Era," NBER Working Papers 15135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Christopher Bailey & Tarique Hossain & Gary Pecquet, 2018. "Private banks in early Michigan, 1837–1884," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 12(1), pages 153-180, January.
  11. Howard Bodenhorn, 2005. "Usury Ceilings, Relationships and Bank Lending Behavior: Evidence from Nineteenth Century," NBER Working Papers 11734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 2014. "Revisiting American Exceptionalism: Democracy and the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Pennsylvania in Comparative Context," NBER Chapters, in: Enterprising America: Businesses, Banks, and Credit Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 25-71, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Jaremski, Matthew & Rousseau, Peter L., 2018. "The dawn of an ‘age of deposits’ in the United States," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 264-281.
  14. Gary B. Gorton, 2016. "The History and Economics of Safe Assets," NBER Working Papers 22210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Matthew Jaremski & Peter L. Rousseau, 2013. "Banks, Free Banks, And U.S. Economic Growth," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1603-1621, April.
  16. Bodenhorn, Howard & Cuberes, David, 2018. "Finance and urbanization in early nineteenth-century New York," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 47-58.
  17. Bodenhorn, Howard, 2007. "Usury ceilings and bank lending behavior: Evidence from nineteenth century New York," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 179-202, April.
  18. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 2014. "Revisiting American Exceptionalism: Democracy and the Regulation of Corporate Governance in Nineteenth-Century Pennsylvania," NBER Working Papers 20231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Howard Bodenhorn, 2015. "Double Liability at Early American Banks," NBER Working Papers 21494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Qerimi, Qerim & Sergi, Bruno, 2009. "The global financial crisis and the post-Lisbon prospects of enlargement," SEER Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 12(4), pages 439-460.
  21. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 645-685, September.
  22. Howard Bodenhorn & David Cuberes, 2010. "Financial Development and City Growth: Evidence from Northeastern American Cities, 1790-1870," NBER Working Papers 15997, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Qian Lu & John Joseph Wallis, 2017. "Banks, Politics, and Political Parties: From Partisan Banking to Open Access in Early Massachusetts," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 109-145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. John Joseph Wallis, 2010. "The Other Foundings: Federalism and the Constitutional Structure of American Government," NBER Chapters, in: Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, pages 177-213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Howard Bodenhorn, 2014. "Voting Rights, Shareholdings, and Leverage at Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 431-458.
  26. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis, 2017. "Introduction to "Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development"," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 1-21, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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