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The Evolution of Bank Boards of Directors in New York, 1840-1950

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  • Howard Bodenhorn
  • Eugene N. White

Abstract

Contemporary bank governance is criticized for manager-dominated (insider) boards of directors, but from the beginning of the nineteenth century, bank presidents appear also to have operated as chairmen of the boards of directors. However, the managers were constrained by a variety of rules that tended to align the interests of management, shareholders and other stakeholders until the mid-twentieth century. We trace this development through New York banking law and new data on banks chartered by the State of New York.

Suggested Citation

  • Howard Bodenhorn & Eugene N. White, 2014. "The Evolution of Bank Boards of Directors in New York, 1840-1950," NBER Working Papers 20078, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20078
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    Cited by:

    1. Calomiris, Charles W. & Carlson, Mark, 2016. "Corporate governance and risk management at unprotected banks: National banks in the 1890s," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 512-532.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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