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Splendid Associations of Favored Individuals: Federal and State Commercial Banking Policy in the Federalist Era

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  • Howard Bodenhorn

Abstract

Early American firms were shaped by contemporary social conceptions of appropriate horizontal power relations inside the firm and the Federalist era bank was shaped by these conceptions. The Federalist era debate on the corporation was much broader than how shareholders would treat with one another. Contemporary Americans who had no direct stake in the business corporation took great interest in its internal governance because rules for how the elite shared power within the corporation spoke to their attitudes toward sharing power in the wider civic polity. Was governance to be plutocratic or democratic? It was within this debate that the first banks were established. This debate influenced how banks were governed, which ultimately influenced how banks did their business. The political debates surrounding the establishment of the Bank of North America (1782) and the Bank of the United States (1791) defined these banks and nearly every bank chartered thereafter up to the mid-1830s and beyond. Specifically, the liberal Bank of North American charter that imposed few meaningful restrictions on the bank's operation, accountability or governance gave way to the Bank of the United States's more restrictive charter that sharply limited its operations, made it accountable to government, and defined many of its internal governance procedures. Subsequent state charters were more closely modeled on the Bank of the United States model than the Bank of North America charter.

Suggested Citation

  • Howard Bodenhorn, 2009. "Splendid Associations of Favored Individuals: Federal and State Commercial Banking Policy in the Federalist Era," NBER Working Papers 15135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15135
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Howard Bodenhorn, 2006. "Bank Chartering and Political Corruption in Antebellum New York. Free Banking as Reform," NBER Chapters, in: Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History, pages 231-257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Wright, Robert E. & Cowen, David J., 2006. "Financial Founding Fathers," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226910680, Febrero.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    4. Anna J. Schwartz, 1987. "The Beginning of Competitive Banking in Philadelphia, 1782–1809," NBER Chapters, in: Money in Historical Perspective, pages 3-23, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Morck, Randall K. (ed.), 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226536781.
    6. Bodenhorn,Howard, 2000. "A History of Banking in Antebellum America," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521662857, October.
    7. Sylla, Richard & Legler, John B. & Wallis, John J., 1987. "Banks and State Public Finance in the New Republic: The United States, 1790–1860," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 391-403, June.
    8. Bodenhorn, Howard, 1992. "Capital Mobility and Financial Integration in Antebellum America," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 585-610, September.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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