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The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance

In: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. S. Mishkin, Frederic, 1999. "Financial consolidation: Dangers and opportunities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 675-691, February.
  2. Edward J. Kane & Berry Wilson, 1998. "A contracting-theory intepretation of the origins of Federal deposit insurance," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 573-595.
  3. Calomiris, Charles W. & Mason, Joseph R. & Wheelock, David C., 2011. "Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach," Working Papers 11-03, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
  4. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
  5. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," CRSP working papers 492, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  6. Chernykh, Lucy & Cole, Rebel A., 2011. "Does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation? Evidence from the Russian experiment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 388-402, February.
  7. Charles Calomiris, 1995. "The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking: American Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914," NBER Chapters, in: Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise, pages 257-322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Charles W. Calomiris & Matthew Jaremski, 2016. "Deposit Insurance: Theories and Facts," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 97-120, October.
  9. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 151, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  10. William L. Silber, 2009. "Why did FDR's bank holiday succeed?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 15(Jul), pages 19-30.
  11. Umlauft, Thomas, 2014. "The Paradoxical Genesis of Too-Big-To-Fail," MPRA Paper 99301, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Michael D. Bordo, 2017. "An historical perspective on financial stability and monetary policy regimes: A case for caution in central banks current obsession with financial stability," Working Paper 2018/5, Norges Bank.
  13. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 407-438, July.
  14. Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, 2013. "A Proposal for the Resolution of Systemically Important Assets and Liabilities: The Case of the Repo Market," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(1), pages 291-351, January.
  15. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3439, The World Bank.
  16. Stephen Haber, 2008. "Differential Paths of Financial Development: Evidence from New World Economies," NBER Chapters, in: Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth: Geography, Institutions, and the Knowledge Economy, pages 89-120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Charles W. Calomiris & Christopher Hanes, 1994. "Historical Macroeconomics and American Macroeconomic History," NBER Working Papers 4935, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Calomiris, Charles W., 1995. "Universal banking and the financing of industrial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1533, The World Bank.
  19. Calomiris, Charles W. & Mason, Joseph R. & Weidenmier, Marc & Bobroff, Katherine, 2013. "The effects of reconstruction finance corporation assistance on Michigan's banks' survival in the 1930s," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 526-547.
  20. repec:ces:ifodic:v:11:y:2014:i:4:p:19105950 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2014. "Interest Groups and the Glass-Steagall Act," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(04), pages 14-18, January.
  22. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  23. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 201-224, December.
  24. Nicholas A. Curott & Tyler Watts & Benjamin R. Thrasher, 2020. "Government-Cheerleading Bias in Money and Banking Textbooks," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 17(1), pages 1-98–151, March.
  25. Willison, Matthew, 2018. "Were banks special? Contrasting viewpoints in mid-nineteenth century Britain," Bank of England working papers 755, Bank of England.
  26. White, Eugene, 1995. "Deposit insurance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1541, The World Bank.
  27. Edward López & Carlos Ramírez, 2004. "Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 413-430, February.
  28. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
  29. Kroszner, Randall S., 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," Working Papers 151, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  30. Eugene N. White, 2015. "Protecting Financial Stability in the Aftermath of World War I: The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Dissenting Policy," NBER Working Papers 21341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Chesini, Giusy & Giaretta, Elisa, 2017. "Depositor discipline for better or for worse. What enhanced depositors’ confidence on the banking system in the last ten years?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 209-227.
  32. Lowell Johnson, 1997. "The Lighthouse Reform Movement in Antebellum America," Departmental Working Papers 199703, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  33. Mathias Lé, 2014. "Heterogeneous Adjustments in Bank Leverage after Deposit Insurance Adoption," Working Papers halshs-01074956, HAL.
  34. Eugene N. White, 2011. ""To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking": How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 16825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  35. Eugene N. White, 1998. "The Legacy of Deposit Insurance: The Growth, Spread, and Cost of Insuring Financial Intermediaries," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 87-121, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Charles Calomiris, 2009. "Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game," NBER Working Papers 15403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Eugene N. White, 2014. "Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s," NBER Chapters, in: Housing and Mortgage Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 115-158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. Keefer, Philip, 2007. "Beyond legal origin and checks and balances : political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4154, The World Bank.
  39. Francesca Carapella, 2015. "Banking panics and deflation in dynamic general equilibrium," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-18, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  40. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  41. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2014. "Interest Groups and the Glass-Steagall Act," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(4), pages 14-18, 01.
  42. Jérôme Sgard, 2000. "La gestion des crises de liquidité internationale : logique de faillite, prêteur en dernier ressort et conditionnalité," Working Papers 2000-16, CEPII research center.
  43. Ikuko Fueda & Masaru Konishi, 2007. "Depositors’ Response to Deposit Insurance Reforms: Evidence from Japan, 1990–2005," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 101-122, June.
  44. Charles Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2003. "How to Restructure Failed Banking Systems: Lessons from the U.S. in the 1930's and Japan in the 1990's," NBER Working Papers 9624, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  45. Charles W. Calomiris, 2009. "Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game," Working Papers 2009/14, Czech National Bank.
  46. Chen, Wang & Zhang, Zhiwen & Hamori, Shigeyuki & Kinkyo, Takuji, 2021. "Not all bank systemic risks are alike: Deposit insurance and bank risk revisited," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  47. Gianni Toniolo & Eugene N. White, 2015. "The Evolution of the Financial Stability Mandate: From Its Origins to the Present Day," NBER Working Papers 20844, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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