Beyond legal origin and checks and balances : political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development
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More about this item
Keywords
Economic Theory&Research; Privatization; Political Economy; Inequality; Legal Products;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DEV-2007-03-10 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2007-03-10 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-03-10 (Regulation)
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