IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/kap/regeco/v9y1996i2p111-32.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Screening Consumers through Alternative Pricing Mechanisms

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Farhad Daruwala & Frank T. Denton & Dean C. Mountain, 2017. "One Size May Not Fit All: Welfare Benefits And Cost Reductions With Differentiated Household Electricity Rates In A General Equilibrium Model," Department of Economics Working Papers 2017-03, McMaster University.
  2. Miravete, Eugenio, 2001. "Quantity Discounts for Time-Varying Consumers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2699, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Ringbom, Staffan & Shy, Oz, 2008. "Refunds and collusion in service industries," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(6), pages 502-516.
  4. Michael Kremer & Christopher Snyder, 2004. "Why is There No AIDS Vaccine?," CID Working Papers 111, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
  5. Michael Kremer, Christopher M. Snyder & Christopher M. Snyder, 2013. "When Is Prevention More Profitable than Cure? The Impact of Time-Varying Consumer Heterogeneity - Working Paper 334," Working Papers 334, Center for Global Development.
  6. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Selling Service Plans to Differentially Informed Customers," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-125, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  7. Daruwala, Farhad & Denton, Frank T. & Mountain, Dean C., 2020. "One size may not fit all: Welfare benefits and cost reductions with optional differentiated household electricity rates," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
  8. Eugenio J. Miravete, "undated". "Quantity Discounts for Taste-Varying Consumers," Penn CARESS Working Papers e8c875d525675df452b9522a2, Penn Economics Department.
  9. Oz Shy & Staffan Ringbom, 2005. "Refunds and Collusion," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0001, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  10. Michael D. Grubb, 2009. "Selling to Overconfident Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1770-1807, December.
  11. Wang, Li & Zhang, Xin-Hua & Zhang, Yue-Jun, 2023. "Designing the pricing mechanism of residents’ self-selection sales electricity based on household size," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 860-878.
  12. Michael D. Grubb & Matthew Osborne, 2015. "Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning, and Bill Shock," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 234-271, January.
  13. Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717.
  14. Kremer, Michael & Snyder, Christopher, 2015. "Vaccines vs. Preventives," CEPR Discussion Papers 10474, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Michael Kremer & Christopher Snyder, 2013. "When is Prevention More Profitable than Cure?," Growth Lab Working Papers 46, Harvard's Growth Lab.
  16. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2013. "When Is Prevention More Profitable than Cure? The Impact of Time-Varying Consumer Heterogeneity," NBER Working Papers 18862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Koji Ishibashi, 2024. "Biased Beliefs of Consumers and Two-Part Tariff Competition," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2024-009, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
  18. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2001. "Screening Through Bundling," Penn CARESS Working Papers 3b8e0b3847b08b90e8570987c, Penn Economics Department.
  19. Mark Armstrong, 2016. "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 583-614, October.
  20. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2015. "Preventives Versus Treatments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(3), pages 1167-1239.
  21. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2012. "Informing consumers about their own preferences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 417-428.
  22. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2002. "Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 943-971.
  23. Danau, Daniel & Vinellay, Annalisa, 2010. "Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-59, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  24. Gérard P. Cachon & Pnina Feldman, 2011. "Pricing Services Subject to Congestion: Charge Per-Use Fees or Sell Subscriptions?," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 13(2), pages 244-260, June.
  25. Bang, Se Hoon & Kim, Jaesoo, 2013. "Price discrimination via information provision," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 215-224.
  26. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2012. "Optimal contract with private information on cost expectation and variability," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201228, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
  27. Richard J. Zeckhauser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 2008. "Schedule Selection by Agents: from Price Plans to Tax Tables," 2008 Meeting Papers 406, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  28. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
  29. Staffan Ringbom & Oz Shy, 2004. "Advance booking, cancellations, and partial refunds," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 13(1), pages 1-7.
  30. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:13:y:2004:i:1:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.