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Regulating the United States Railroads: The Effects of Sunk Costs and Asymmetric Risk

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Evans, Lewis & Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Incentive Regulation of Prices when Costs are Sunk," Working Paper Series 18971, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  2. Borrmann, Jörg & Brunekreeft, Gert, 2020. "The timing of monopoly investment under cost-based and price-based regulation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  3. Moretto, Michele & Panteghini, Paolo M. & Scarpa, Carlo, 2008. "Profit sharing and investment by regulated utilities: A welfare analysis," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 315-337, December.
  4. Evans, Lewis & Guthrie, Graeme, 2003. "Asset Stranding is Inevitable: Implications for Optimal Regulatory Design," Working Paper Series 18978, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  5. Lewis Evans & Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 239-264, May.
  6. Pindyck, Robert S., 2005. "Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust," Working papers 18233, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  7. Mark Burton & Charles Sims, 2016. "Understanding Railroad Investment Behaviors, Regulatory Processes, and Related Implications for Efficient Industry Oversight," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 263-288, September.
  8. Evans, Lewis T. & Guthrie, Graeme A., 2005. "Risk, price regulation, and irreversible investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 109-128, February.
  9. Krutilla,Kerry Mace & Good,David Henning & Toman,Michael A. & Arin,Tijen, 2020. "Implementing Precaution in Benefit-Cost Analysis : The Case of Deep Seabed Mining," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9307, The World Bank.
  10. Leal, Fernando I. & Rego, Erik E. & de Oliveira Ribeiro, Celma, 2019. "Natural gas regulation and policy in Brazil: Prospects for the market expansion and energy integration in Mercosul," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 817-829.
  11. Paolo Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2008. "Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(3), pages 253-274, September.
  12. Gabriel Fiuza de Bragança & Katia Rocha & Fernando Camacho, 2006. "A Taxa de Remuneração do Capital e a Nova Regulação das Telecomunicações," Discussion Papers 1160, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
  13. Marcel Boyer, 2010. "The Measure and Regulation of Competition in Telecommunications Markets," Chapters, in: Anastassios Gentzoglanis & Anders Henten (ed.), Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  14. Evans, Lewis & Guthrie, Graeme, 2003. "Asset Stranding is Inevitable: Implications for Optimal Regulatory Design," Working Paper Series 3881, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  15. Jerry Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, 2014. "Telecommunications Regulation: Current Approaches with the End in Sight," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 345-406, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
  17. Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Working Paper Series 18946, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  18. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18971 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Fernando Camacho & Flavio Menezes, 2009. "Access pricing and investment: a real options approach," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 107-126, October.
  20. Fernando T. Camacho & Flavio M. Menezes, 2008. "Price Regulation and Investment: A Real Options Approach," Discussion Papers Series 373, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  21. Hirschhausen, Christian von, 2008. "Infrastructure, regulation, investment and security of supply: A case study of the restructured US natural gas market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10, March.
  22. Robert S. Pindyck, 2005. "Pricing Capital Under Mandatory Unbundling and Facilities Sharing," NBER Working Papers 11225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Franklin, Sergio Luis & Diallo, Madiagne, 2013. "Real options and cost-based access pricing: Model and methodology," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 321-333.
  24. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18978 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Fernando T. Camacho & Flavio Menezes, 2008. "Regulation and the Option to Delay," Discussion Papers Series 356, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  26. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18946 is not listed on IDEAS
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