The Political Economy of Targeting

Citations

Cited by:

1. Andreas Bergh, 2004. "On the Redistributive Effect of Upper Benefit Limits in Bismarckian Social Insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 73-78, Autumn.
2. Paulo Júlio, 2011. "Public Debt Stabilization: Redistributive Delays Versus Preemptive Anticipations," GEE Papers 0045, Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos, Ministério da Economia, revised Dec 2011.
3. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March.
   • CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1449, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Post-Print hal-02520562, HAL.
4. Cardak, Buly A. & Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 2020. "Majority voting in a model of means testing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
   • Buly A. Cardak & Gerhard Glomm & B. Ravikumar, 2018. "Majority Voting in a Model of Means Testing," Working Papers 2018-14, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 27 Nov 2019.
5. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2003. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 181-196, July.
   • Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., 2001. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2002. "Social Insurance Competition between Bismark and Beveridge," IDEI Working Papers 141, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003.
   • CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2003. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1697, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
6. Kraus, Margit, 2000. "Social security strategies and redistributive effects in European social transfer systems," ZEW Discussion Papers 00-40, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
7. Christophe Muller, 2007. "Anti-Poverty Transfers without Riots in Tunisia," Working Papers DT/2007/08, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
   • Christophe Muller, 2008. "Anti-Poverty Transfers without Riots in Tunisia," THEMA Working Papers 2008-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
   • Christophe Muller, 2008. "Anti-Poverty Transfers without Riots in Tunisia," IDEP Working Papers 0801, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Mar 2008.
   • Christophe Muller, 2008. "Anti-Poverty Transfers without Riots in Tunisia," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   • Christophe Muller, 2007. "Anti-Poverty Transfers without Riots in Tunisia," Discussion Papers 07/06, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
8. Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 503-522, September.
   • CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1999. "The political economy of social security," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER , Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2000. "The political economy of social security," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1475, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," Post-Print hal-02520571, HAL.
   • Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 259, CESifo.
9. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
   • De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Papers 00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
   • DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
10. Arne Bigsten & Jörgen Levin, 2001. "Growth, Income Distribution, and Poverty," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-129, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
11. Philippe De Donder & Michel Le Breton & Eugenio Peluso, 2012. "Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer–Shepsle versus Stackelberg," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(6), pages 879-909, December.
    • De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Peluso, Eugenio, 2010. "Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg," IDEI Working Papers 593, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Peluso, Eugenio, 2010. "Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg," CEPR Discussion Papers 7646, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
12. Mehta, Aashish & Jha, Shikha, 2014. "Pilferage from opaque food subsidy programs: Theory and evidence," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 69-79.
13. Michaël Zemmour, 2012. "Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12090, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Michaël Zemmour, 2012. "Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12090r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Mar 2013.
    • Michaël Zemmour, 2012. "Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00768909, HAL.
14. Wim van Oorschot & Femke Roosma, 2015. "The social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits," ImPRovE Working Papers 15/11, Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy, University of Antwerp.
15. Ravallion,Martin, 2000. "Are the poor protected from budget cuts? theory and evidence for Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2391, The World Bank.
16. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
    • De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Papers 00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    • Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
17. Ravallion, Martin, 2003. "Targeted transfers in poor countries : revisiting the tradeoffs and policy options," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3048, The World Bank.
    • Martin Ravallion, 2003. "Targeted transfers in poor countries : revisiting the trade-offs and policy options," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 27869, The World Bank.
18. Ravallion, Martin, 2002. "Are the Poor Protected from Budget Cuts? Evidence for Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, May.
    • Martin Ravallion, 2002. "Are the Poor Protected from Budget Cuts? Evidence for Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 5, pages 95-121, May.
    • Martin Ravallion, 2002. "Are the Poor Protected from Budget Cuts? Evidence for Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 95-121, May.
19. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2002. "Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 375-394, March.
20. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2001. "Community based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 23146, The World Bank.
21. Martin Ravallion, 1999. "Is More Targeting Consistent with Less Spending?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(3), pages 411-419, August.
    • Ravallion, Martin, 1999. "Is more targeting consistent with less spending?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2079, The World Bank.
22. Zohal Hessami & Claudio Thum & Silke Uebelmesser, 2012. "A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution: The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-25, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
23. Martin Ravallion, 2013. "The Idea of Antipoverty Policy," NBER Working Papers 19210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
24. Martin Ravallion, 2004. "Who is protected from budget cuts?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 109-122.
25. Michaël Zemmour, 2015. "Economie politique du financement progressif de la protection sociale," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01205217, HAL.
26. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2000. "Community Based Targeting for Social Safety Nets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.
27. Philippe De Donder & Eugenio Peluso, 2018. "Politically sustainable targeted transfers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 301-313, March.
28. Ravallion, Martin, 2019. "Guaranteed employment or guaranteed income?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 209-221.
    • Martin Ravallion, 2018. "Guaranteed Employment or Guaranteed Income?," Working Papers 482, Center for Global Development.
29. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4596cgacdn8svqf2eog4tv7b2i is not listed on IDEAS
30. repec:hal:journl:hal-01205217 is not listed on IDEAS
31. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4596cgacdn8svqf2eog4tv7b2i is not listed on IDEAS
32. Karl Ove Moene & Michael Wallerstein, 2001. "Targeting and political support for welfare spending," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 3-24, March.
33. Pritchett, Lant, 2005. "The political economy of targeted safety nets," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 31498, The World Bank.
34. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    • Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2007. "Transfers in Cash and In Kind: Theory Meets the Data," NBER Working Papers 13557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
35. Schüring, Esther & Gassmann, Franziska, 2012. "Whom to target: an obvious choice?," MERIT Working Papers 2012-028, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
36. Michaël Zemmour, 2015. "Economie politique du financement progressif de la protection sociale," Working Papers hal-01205217, HAL.