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Sent Seeking With Private Values

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Fu, Qiang & Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Communication and commitment in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 1-19.
  2. Andrew Yates, 2011. "Winner-pay contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 93-106, April.
  3. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2007. "Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 768-776, September.
  4. Rob Everhardt & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2015. "Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 38(1), pages 55-73, April.
  5. Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 245-261, June.
  6. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Fuzzy Price-Quality Ratio Procurement under Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 12/26, Department of Economics, University of York.
  7. Alexander Matros & Alex Possajennikov, 2014. "Common Value Allocation Mechanisms with Private Information: Lotteries or Auctions?," Discussion Papers 2014-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  9. Stracke, Rudi & Sunde, Uwe, 2014. "Dynamic Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Multi-Stage Promotion Contests," IZA Discussion Papers 8368, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  10. Lars P. Metzger, 2015. "Alliance Formation in Contests with Incomplete Information," Ruhr Economic Papers 0544, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  11. Mark Fey, 2008. "Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 225-236, June.
  12. Marco Sorge, 2015. "Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
  13. Christian Ewerhart, 2010. "Rent-seeking contests with independent private values," IEW - Working Papers 490, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  14. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  15. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2013. "Who gains from information asymmetry?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 305-337, September.
  16. Kirkegaard, René, 2013. "Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 261-266.
  17. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
  18. Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020. "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  19. Wasser, Cédric, 2013. "A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 180-182.
  20. Metzger, Lars P., 2015. "Alliance Formation in Contests with Incomplete Information," Ruhr Economic Papers 544, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  21. Sandra Ludwig, 2012. "Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 341-355, December.
  22. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with an unknown number of contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 353-368, December.
  23. Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 103-114.
  24. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2007. "Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 49-64, July.
  25. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2017. "Escalation in Dynamic Conflict: On Beliefs and Selection," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  26. Mercier, Jean-François, 2018. "Non-deterministic group contest with private information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-53.
  27. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  28. Andrea Gallice, 2013. "Rent-seeking contests with private values and common knowledge about the mean," Working papers 023, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
  29. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  30. repec:zbw:rwirep:0544 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Lambert Schoonbeek & Barbara Winkel, 2006. "Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 123-132, April.
  32. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  33. Pierre Fauvet & Sébastien Rouillon, 2016. "Would you trust lobbies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 201-219, June.
  34. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2018. "To Deter Or To Moderate? Alliance Formation In Contests With Incomplete Information," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1447-1463, July.
  35. Alexander Matros, 2007. "Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players," Working Paper 323, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2008.
  36. Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Repeated contests with asymmetric information [Wiederholte Wettkämpfe mit asymmetrischer Information]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-08, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  37. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2015. "Probabilistic procurement auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 25-46, March.
  38. Andrea Gallice, 2014. "Rent-seeking contests with private valuations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 390, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  39. Yong Sui, 2009. "Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 409-422, March.
  40. Malueg, David A. & Yates, Andrew J., 2005. "Equilibria and comparative statics in two-player contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 738-752, September.
  41. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2009. "Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/111, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  42. Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017. "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 36-40.
  43. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling In Elimination Contests," Working Paper 1184, Economics Department, Queen's University.
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