Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-7974-y
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Rob Everhardt & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2015. "Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 38(1), pages 55-73, April.
- Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 245-261, June.
- Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 103-114.
- Andrea Gallice, 2013. "Rent-seeking contests with private values and common knowledge about the mean," Working papers 023, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2012.
"Fuzzy Price-Quality Ratio Procurement under Incomplete Information,"
Discussion Papers
12/26, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Probabilistic Procurement Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 4320, CESifo.
- Yangguang Huang & Ming He, 2021. "Structural Analysis Of Tullock Contests With An Application To U.S. House Of Representatives Elections," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1011-1054, August.
- Ori Haimanko, 2021.
"Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 1231-1258, April.
- Ori Haimanko, 2020. "Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Existence In (Almost Continuous) Contests," Working Papers 2013, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2015.
"Probabilistic procurement auctions,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 25-46, March.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Probabilistic Procurement Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 4320, CESifo.
- Mercier, Jean-François, 2018. "Non-deterministic group contest with private information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-53.
- Lambert Schoonbeek, 2017. "Information And Endogenous Delegation In A Rent-Seeking Contest," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(3), pages 1497-1510, July.
- Eric Sjöberg, 2014. "Settlement under the threat of conflict-The cost of asymmetric information," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2014_02, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
- Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020.
"Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
- Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2013. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," ECON - Working Papers 133, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2018.
- Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2010. "Contests with private costs: Beyond two players," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 558-567, December.
- Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
- Andrea Gallice, 2014. "Rent-seeking contests with private valuations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 390, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Gallice, Andrea, 2017. "An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 673-684.
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