IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/kap/copoec/v4y1993i1p1-6.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Heshmati Almas & Karlson Nils & Box Marcus, 2013. "Generality, State Neutrality and Unemployment in the OECD," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 333-358, December.
  2. Leschke, Martin, 2015. "Alternativen zur Marktwirtschaft: Ein kritischer Blick auf die Ansätze von Niko Paech und Christian Felber aus Sicht der konstitutionellen Ökonomik," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) 140887, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
  3. Pies, Ingo, 2004. "Wirtschaftsethik als Beitrag zur Ordnungspolitik: Ein interdisziplinäres Forschungsprogramm demokratischer Politikberatung," Discussion Papers 2004-5, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
  4. Wihlborg, Clas, 2005. "Solving the bargaining democracy problem using a constitutional hierarchy for law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 655-673, April.
  5. Zeljko Bogetic & Arye Hillman, 2005. "The Tax Base in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 1267 (March 1994), The World Bank," Public Economics 0510009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Vanberg Viktor, 1993. "Constitutionally Constrained and Safeguarded Competition in Markets and Politics with reference to a European Constitution," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 3-28, March.
  7. Paniagua, Victoria & Vogler, Jan P., 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 110926, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. James M. Buchanan, 1995. "Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 141-150, April.
  9. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2000. "Political culture and economic decline," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 219-243, Springer.
  10. Otto Lehto & John Meadowcroft, 2021. "Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 145-164, June.
  11. Hansjürgens, Bernd & Schröter-Schlaack, Christoph & Berghöfer, Augustin & Lienhoop, Nele, 2017. "Justifying social values of nature: Economic reasoning beyond self-interested preferences," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 9-17.
  12. Watanabe, Kou, 2014. "Optimale Rahmenbedingungen in der wirtschaftspolitischen Beratung: Vier Konzepte als institutionelle Ergänzung," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 59, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  13. Kyriacou, Andreas P., 2000. "An Ethnically Based Federal and Bicameral System: The case of Cyprus," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 251-268, June.
  14. Palma, José Gabriel, 2020. "Why the rich always stay rich (no matter what, no matter the cost)," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
  15. E.V. Popov, 2021. "Drivers of the Economy in the Context of the Coronavirus Pandemic," Journal of Applied Economic Research, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 20(1), pages 5-30.
  16. Anthony Evans, 2014. "A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 23-44, March.
  17. Hansjürgens, Bernd & Schröter-Schlaack, Christoph & Berghöfer, Augustin & Lienhoop, Nele, 2016. "Reprint:Justifying social values of nature: Economic reasoning beyond self-interested preferences," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 22(PB), pages 228-237.
  18. Berthold, Norbert & Stettes, Oliver, 2000. "Globalisierung und Strukturwandel - droht das Ende des Sozialstaates," Discussion Paper Series 35, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
  19. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2020. "J. M. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalism: political economy for democratic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 339-370, June.
  20. Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski, 2018. "The foundation of contemporary economics: James Buchanan and constitutional economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 113-122.
  21. Bogetic, Zeljko & Hillman, Arye L., 1994. "The tax base in transition : the case of Bulgaria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1267, The World Bank.
  22. Fehn, Rainer, 2001. "Ist die Globalisierung der Totengräber nationaler Sozialpolitik?," Discussion Paper Series 43, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
  23. Daniele Bertolini, 2019. "Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 41-69, October.
  24. Coenen, Michael & Watanabe, Kou, 2016. "Institutionelle Ergänzungen für die wirtschaftspolitische Beratung," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 82, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  25. T. Durant, 2011. "Making executive politics mutually productive and fair," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-172, June.
  26. Niclas Berggren, 2000. "Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 353-369, December.
  27. Alain Marciano, 2023. "The Political Economy of Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma," Springer Books, in: Martin A. Leroch & Florian Rupp (ed.), Power and Responsibility, pages 345-357, Springer.
  28. Sautet Frédéric, 2002. "Kirznerian Economics: Some Policy Implications and Issues," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-23, March.
  29. Eusepi, Giuseppe, 2006. "Public finance and welfare: From the ignorance of the veil to the veil of ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 460-477, April.
  30. Victoria Paniagua & Jan P. Vogler, 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 25-52, March.
  31. Joachim Wessels, 1993. "Redistribution from a constitutional perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 425-448, September.
  32. Palma, J. G., 2020. "Why the Rich Stay Rich. On dysfunctional institutions’ “ability to persist” (no matter what)," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 20124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.