Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

Citations

Cited by:

1. Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2024. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 165-198, December.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2019. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03393094, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2024. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-04511257, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2019. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393094, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2024. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," Post-Print hal-04511257, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2024. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04511257, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2019. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393094, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2019. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," Working Papers hal-03393094, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2024. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-04511257, HAL.
2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6unm655ita9ojbuuc83c9h0is8 is not listed on IDEAS
3. Wendelin Schnedler & Nina Lucia Stephan, 2020. "Revisiting a Remedy Against Chains of Unkindness," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 72(3), pages 347-364, July.
   • Schnedler, Wendelin & Stephan, Nina, 2020. "Revisiting a Remedy Against Chains of Unkindness," EconStor Preprints 215708, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
   • Schnedler, Wendelin & Stephan, Nina Lucia, 2020. "Revisiting a Remedy against the Chain of Unkindness," IZA Discussion Papers 13135, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
4. Wendelin Schnedler & Radovan Vadovic, 2011. "Legitimacy of Control," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 985-1009, December.
   • Schnedler, Wendelin & Vadovic, Radovan, 2007. "Legitimacy of control," Papers 07-61, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
   • Wendelin Schnedler & Radovan Vadovic, 2007. "Legitimacy of Control," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 07/178, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
   • Schnedler, Wendelin & Vadovic, Radovan, 2007. "Legitimacy of Control," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-61, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
   • Schnedler, Wendelin & Vadovic, Radovan, 2007. "Legitimacy of Control," IZA Discussion Papers 3013, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
5. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6unm655ita9ojbuuc83c9h0is8 is not listed on IDEAS
6. Beckmann, Michael & Cornelissen, Thomas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Self-managed working time and employee effort: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 285-302.
   • Michael Beckmann & Thomas Cornelissen & Matthias Kräkel, 2015. "Self-Managed Working Time and Employee Effort: Theory and Evidence," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 768, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
7. Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Miriam Krueger & Nikolay Zubanov, 2017. "Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2168-2203, August.
   • Friebel, Guido & Zubanov, Nick & Heinz, Matthias & Krüger, Miriam, 2015. "Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain," CEPR Discussion Papers 10796, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Friebel, Guido & Heinz, Matthias & Krueger, Miriam & Zubanov, Nikolay, 2017. "Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168285, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   • Friebel, Guido & Heinz, Matthias & Krüger, Miriam & Zubanov, Nick, 2015. "Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain," IZA Discussion Papers 9316, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
8. Galbiati, Roberto & Schlag, Karl H. & van der Weele, Joël J., 2013. "Sanctions that signal: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 34-51.
   • Roberto Galbiatiy & Karl Schlagz & Joel van der Weele, 2010. "Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001104, David K. Levine.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van Der Weele, 2013. "Sanctions that signal: An experiment," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03461037, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van Der Weele, 2013. "Sanctions that signal: An experiment," Post-Print hal-03461037, HAL.
   • Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joel van der Weele, 2011. "Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment," Vienna Economics Papers vie1107, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
9. Danilov, Anastasia & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013. "Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 7477, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
10. von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2013. "Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 55-65.
    • Ferdinand von Siemens, 2011. "Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Ferdinand von Siemens, 2011. "Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control," CESifo Working Paper Series 3553, CESifo.
11. Schnedler Wendelin, 2011. "You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income and Effort," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-10, February.
    • Wendelin Schnedler, 2011. "You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income and Effort," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 1-10, February.
    • Wendelin Schnedler, 2009. "You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income, and Effort," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 09/226, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
12. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6unm655ita9ojbuuc83c9h0is8 is not listed on IDEAS
13. Marvin Deversi & Lisa Spantig, 2023. "Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company," CESifo Working Paper Series 10302, CESifo.
14. Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008. "Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment," IZA Discussion Papers 3685, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008. "Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-17, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    • Paul A. Grout & Wendelin Schnedler, 2008. "Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/202, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    • Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008. "Non-profit organizations in a bureaucratic environment," Papers 08-17, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
15. Herold, Florian, 2010. "Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 180-191, January.
16. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09o0ks2e12i is not listed on IDEAS
17. Galbiati, Roberto & Schlag, Karl H. & van der Weele, Joël J., 2013. "Sanctions that signal: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 34-51.
    • Roberto Galbiatiy & Karl Schlagz & Joel van der Weele, 2010. "Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001104, David K. Levine.
    • Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van der Weele, 2013. "Sanctions that signal: An experiment," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6, Sciences Po.
    • Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joel van der Weele, 2011. "Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment," Vienna Economics Papers 1107, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
18. Schnedler, Wendelin & Vanberg, Christoph, 2014. "Playing ‘hard to get’: An economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 106-115.
    • Schnedler, Wendelin & Vanberg, Christoph, 2014. "Playing 'Hard to Get': An Economic Rationale for Crowding Out of Intrinsically Motivated Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 8108, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Wendelin Schnedler & Christoph Vanberg, 2014. "Playing `Hard to Get': An Economic Rationale for Crowding Out of Intrinsically Motivated Behaviour," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 14/320, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    • Schnedler, Wendelin & Vanberg, Christoph, 2014. "Playing 'Hard to Get': An Economic Rationale for Crowding Out of Intrinsically Motivated Behavior," Working Papers 0559, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
19. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09o0ks2e12i is not listed on IDEAS
20. Ester Manna, 2015. "Intrinsically Motivated Agents in Teams," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2015/326, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
21. Anastasia Danilov & Dirk Sliwka, 2017. "Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 459-476, February.
22. Kräkel, Matthias, 2018. "Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation," IZA Discussion Papers 11289, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
23. Anastasia Danilov & Kiryl Khalmetski & Dirk Sliwka, 2018. "Norms and Guilt," CESifo Working Paper Series 6999, CESifo.
24. Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2019. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," SciencePo Working papers halshs-02145486, HAL.
25. Danilov, Anastasia & Khalmetski, Kiryl & Sliwka, Dirk, 2021. "Descriptive Norms and Guilt Aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 293-311.
26. Cerrone Claudia & Manna Ester, 2018. "Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-8, January.
27. repec:awi:wpaper:0450 is not listed on IDEAS
28. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2024. "Adverse effects of control? Evidence from a field experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(2), pages 469-488, April.
29. Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & Swank, Otto H., 2013. "When Galatea cares about her reputation: How having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 91-104.
    • Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst & Otto H. Swank, 2010. "When Galatea cares about her Reputation: How having Faith in your Workers reduces their Motivation to shine," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-123/1, Tinbergen Institute.
30. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6unm655ita9ojbuuc83c9h0is8 is not listed on IDEAS
31. repec:awi:wpaper:0474 is not listed on IDEAS