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Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Stennek, M.J., 1995. "Competition Reduces X-Inefficiency : A Note on a Limited Liability Mechanism," Discussion Paper 1995-56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Fluet, Claude, 1999. "Régulation des risques et insolvabilité : le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 379-399, mars-juin.
  3. Bernstein, J.I. & Nadiri, M.I., 1993. "Production, Financial Structure and Productivity Growth in U.S. Manufacturing," Working Papers 93-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  4. Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003. "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May.
  5. Elie Appelbaum, 2002. "Union Contracts and the Firm's Financial Structure," Working Papers 2002_12, York University, Department of Economics.
  6. Hossain, Ferdaus & Jain, Ruchi, 2001. "Financial Structure, Production and Productivity Growth in U.S. Food Manufacturing Industry," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20756, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  7. Nicolas Lampach & Kene Boun My & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Risk, Ambiguity and Efficient Liability Rules: An experiment," Working Papers of BETA 2016-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  8. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2006. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," Chapters, in: Fabienne IIzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn (ed.), European Merger Control, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  9. Fraja, Gianni De & Piga, Claudio A. G., 2004. "Strategic debt in vertical relationships: theory and evidence," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 103-123, June.
  10. Gerald T. Garvey, 1992. "Leveraging The Underinvestment Problem: How High Debt And Management Shareholdings Solve The Agency Costs Of Free Cash Flow," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 15(2), pages 149-166, June.
  11. Gianni De Fraja & Claudio A. G. Piga, "undated". "Strategic Debt in Vertical Relationships," Discussion Papers 98/16, Department of Economics, University of York.
  12. Michael Magill, 2000. "Equity, Options and Efficiency in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1845, Econometric Society.
  13. Hennessy, Christopher A. & Livdan, Dmitry, 2009. "Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm-supplier relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 382-399, September.
  14. Wagner, W.B., 2000. "Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard," Other publications TiSEM e1835d1b-f90b-4907-be6c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Aney, Madhav S. & Appelbaum, Elie & Banerji, Sanjay, 2019. "Firm boundaries and financing with opportunistic stakeholder behaviour," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 437-457.
  17. Stennek, M.J., 1995. "Competition Reduces X-Inefficiency : A Note on a Limited Liability Mechanism," Other publications TiSEM 857a7490-81ee-455b-abf1-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  18. Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert & Gagnon, Francois & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Debt, moral hazard and airline safety An empirical evidence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 379-402, August.
  19. Elie Appelbaum, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, Bankruptcy and the Firm’s Capital Structure," Working Papers 2007_06, York University, Department of Economics.
  20. Teresa John & Lemma Senbet & Anant Sundaram & Peter Woodward, 2005. "Limited Liability and Market Power," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 215-231, November.
  21. Appelbaum, Elie, 2021. "Improving the efficacy of carbon tax policies," Journal of Government and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(C).
  22. Istaitieh, Abdulaziz & Rodriguez-Fernandez, Jose M., 2006. "Factor-product markets and firm's capital structure: A literature review," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 49-75.
  23. Abdulaziz Istaitieh & José M. Rodríguez‐Fernández, 2006. "Factor‐product markets and firm's capital structure: A literature review," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 49-75.
  24. Wagner, W.B., 2000. "Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper 2000-92, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  25. Stennek, Johan, 2000. "Competition increases x-efficiency: A limited liability mechanism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1727-1744, October.
  26. Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine, 2002. "Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 149-190, September.
  27. Jyh‐Bang Jou & Tan Lee, 2004. "Debt Overhang, Costly Expandability and Reversibility, and Optimal Financial Structure," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(7‐8), pages 1191-1222, September.
  28. van't Veld, Klaas, 1997. "The Judgement Proof Opportunity," CUDARE Working Papers 198656, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  29. Florian Baumann, 2010. "Severance Payments as a Commitment Device," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(4), pages 715-734, December.
  30. Jacques Lawarree & Marc van Audenrode, 2000. "Moral Hazard and Limited Liability," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0971, Econometric Society.
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