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Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2013. "Too Big to Manage? Two Book Reviews," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 143-162.
  2. Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2007. "How much would banks be willing to pay to become \"too-big-to-fail\" and to capture other benefits?," Research Working Paper RWP 07-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  3. Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2013. "How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-35, February.
  4. Israel, Karl-Friedrich, 2017. "In the long run we are all unemployed?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 67-81.
  5. Benbouzid, Nadia & Leonida, Leone & Mallick, Sushanta K., 2018. "The non-monotonic impact of bank size on their default swap spreads: Cross-country evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 226-240.
  6. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2005. "How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail?," NBER Working Papers 11814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Bruno Martins & Ricardo Schechtman, 2013. "Too Rich to Let Me Fail?," Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers 13, CEMLA.
  8. Jorge Guillén, 2009. "A lesson to learn from developed countries: The Case of State Branching Deregulation in the US," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 36(1 Year 20), pages 67-95, June.
  9. Viral V. Acharya & Thomas Cooley & Matthew Richardson & Ingo Walter, 2011. "Market Failures and Regulatory Failures : Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises," Finance Working Papers 23273, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  10. Louzis, Dimitrios P. & Vouldis, Angelos T. & Metaxas, Vasilios L., 2012. "Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer loan portfolios," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1012-1027.
  11. Ning Gong & Kenneth D. Jones, 2013. "Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 13(3), pages 299-325, September.
  12. Tehmina Fiaz Qazi & Abdul Aziz Khan Niazi & Abdul Basit & Abdul Rehman & Aysha Nazir, 2019. "The Jostle of Workplace Pressures on Credit Managers: Interpretive Structural Modeling to Underpin the Severity," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 8(3), pages 155-163, September.
  13. Cubillas, Elena & Fernández, Ana I. & González, Francisco, 2017. "How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 46-67.
  14. Koetter, Michael, 2006. "The stability of efficiency rankings when risk-preferences and objectives are different," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2006,08, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  15. Ma, Chang & Nguyen, Xuan-Hai, 2021. "Too big to fail and optimal regulation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 747-758.
  16. Moutsianas, Konstantinos A. & Kosmidou, Kyriaki, 2016. "Bank earnings volatility in the UK: Does size matter? A comparison between commercial and investment banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 137-150.
  17. DeYoung, Robert & Kowalik, Michal & Reidhill, Jack, 2013. "A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 612-627.
  18. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2011. "Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-210, March.
  19. Zhu, Jiaqing & Li, Guangzhong & Li, Jie, 2017. "Merge to be too big to fail: A real option approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 342-353.
  20. Andreas Dombret & André Ebner, 2013. "Default of Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries: Short-term Stability versus Incentive Compatibility?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(1), pages 15-30, February.
  21. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2009. "Does banks size distort market prices? Evidence for too-big-to-fail in the CDS market," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2009,06, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  22. Kanas, Angelos, 2014. "Default risk and equity prices in the U.S. banking sector: Regime switching effects of regulatory changes," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 244-258.
  23. Robert DeYoung & Douglas Evanoff & Philip Molyneux, 2009. "Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial Institutions: A Review of the Post-2000 Literature," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 87-110, December.
  24. Phil Molyneux & Klaus Schaeck & Tim Zhou, 2011. "‘Too Systemically Important to Fail’ in Banking," Working Papers 11011, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
  25. Rrustem Asllanaj, 2018. "Does Credit Risk Management affect the Financial Performance of Commercial Banks in Kosovo?," International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 7(2), pages 49-57, April.
  26. Molyneux, Philip & Schaeck, Klaus & Zhou, Tim Mi, 2014. "‘Too systemically important to fail’ in banking – Evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(PB), pages 258-282.
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