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Models of policy under stochastic replanning

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1996. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Papers (Old Series) 9601, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  2. A. Hakan Kara, 2007. "Monetary Policy under Imperfect Commitment: Reconciling Theory with Evidence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 149-178, March.
  3. Dennis, Richard, 2014. "Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 218-234.
  4. Gersbach, Hans & Liu, Yulin & Tischhauser, Martin, 2021. "Versatile forward guidance: escaping or switching?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  5. Nunes, Ricardo, 2008. "Delegation and Loose Commitment," MPRA Paper 11555, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Ippei Fujiwara & Timothy Kam & Takeki Sunakawa, 2016. "A note on imperfect credibility," CAMA Working Papers 2016-37, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  7. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2017. "Can We Identify the Fed's Preferences?," Working Papers halshs-01549908, HAL.
  8. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
  9. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from New-Keynesian Taylor Rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  10. Jeffrey Campbell & Jacob Weber, 2021. "Discretion rather than rules: Equilibrium uniqueness and forward guidance with inconsistent optimal plans," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, pages 243-254, July.
  11. Fabrizio Zampolli & Andrew Blake, 2005. "Time Consistent Policy in Markov Switching Models," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 2, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  12. Lakdawala, Aeimit & Wu, Shu, 2017. "Federal Reserve credibility and the term structure of interest rates," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 364-389.
  13. Debortoli, Davide & Nunes, Ricardo, 2010. "Fiscal policy under loose commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1005-1032, May.
  14. Alex Haberis & Richard Harrison & Matt Waldron, 2014. "Transitory interest-rate pegs under imperfect credibility," Discussion Papers 1422, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
  15. Givens, Gregory E., 2016. "On the gains from monetary policy commitment under deep habits," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 19-36.
  16. Yang Lu & Ernesto Pasten & Robert King, 2013. "Policy design with private sector skepticism in the textbook New Keynesian model," 2013 Meeting Papers 241, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2011. "Monetary regime switches and unstable objectives," International Finance Discussion Papers 1036, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  18. Himmels, Christoph & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2011. "Expectations Traps and Monetary Policy with Limited Commitment," MPRA Paper 29208, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Policy Maker’s Credibility with Predetermined Instruments for Forward-Looking Targets," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 823-846.
  20. Lu, Yang K. & King, Robert G. & Pasten, Ernesto, 2016. "Optimal reputation building in the New Keynesian model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 233-249.
  21. Alex Clymo & Andrea Lanteri, 2020. "Fiscal Policy with Limited-Time Commitment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(627), pages 623-652.
  22. Debortoli, Davide & Maih, Junior & Nunes, Ricardo, 2014. "Loose Commitment In Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Models: Theory And Applications," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 175-198, January.
  23. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
  24. A. Hakan Kara, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy, Commitment, and Imperfect Credibility," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 4(1), pages 31-66.
  25. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2021. "Hopf Bifurcation From New-Keynesian Taylor Rule To Ramsey Optimal Policy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(8), pages 2204-2236, December.
  26. Fujiwara, Ippei & Kam, Timothy & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2019. "On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 22-25.
  27. Himmels, Christoph & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2013. "Escaping expectation traps: How much commitment is required?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 649-665.
  28. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1992. "Commitment as irreversible investment," Working Papers (Old Series) 9217, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  29. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2018. "The Indeterminacy of Determinacy with Fiscal, Macro-prudential or Taylor Rules," Working Papers halshs-01877766, HAL.
  30. KARA Hakan, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Policy Rules under Imperfect Commitment: Reconciling Theory with Evidence," EcoMod2003 330700077, EcoMod.
  31. Gilles Chemla & Christopher Hennessy, 2021. "Equilibrium Counterfactuals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(2), pages 639-669, May.
  32. Robert G. King & Yang K. Lu, 2020. "Managing Expectations in the New Keynesian Model," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202007, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
  33. Kasa, Kenneth, 2002. "Model Uncertainty, Robust Policies, And The Value Of Commitment," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 145-166, February.
  34. William Roberds, 1986. "Solution of linear-quadratic- Gaussian dynamic games using variational methods," Staff Report 105, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  35. Oscar To, 2024. "Stochastic credibility and optimal monetary policy," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(S1), pages 124-134, May.
  36. Kasa, Kenneth, 1998. "Optimal policy with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 887-910, June.
  37. Gino Cateau & Malik Shukayev, 2022. "Limited commitment, endogenous credibility and the challenges of price‐level targeting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1834-1861, November.
  38. Nunes, Ricardo & Park, Donghyun & Rondina, Luca, 2021. "Imperfect credibility, sticky wages, and welfare," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  39. Christian Matthes, 2015. "Figuring Out the Fed—Beliefs about Policymakers and Gains from Transparency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 1-29, February.
  40. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2008. "The macroeconomic effect of external pressures on monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 944, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  41. Eurilton Araújo, 2016. "Monetary Policy Credibility and the Comovement between Stock Returns and Inflation," Working Papers Series 449, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
  42. Andrew P Blake & Fabrizio Zampolli, 2006. "Optimal monetary policy in Markov-switching models with rational expectations agents," Bank of England working papers 298, Bank of England.
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