A note on imperfect credibility
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Cited by:
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2017.
"Can We Identify the Fed's Preferences?,"
Working Papers
halshs-01549908, HAL.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2017. "Can we Identify the Fed's Preferences?," MPRA Paper 76831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2017. "Can We Identify the Fed's Preferences?," PSE Working Papers halshs-01549908, HAL.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2017. "Can we Identify the Fed's Preferences?," EconStor Preprints 149993, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, revised 2017.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2021.
"Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 72(1), pages 43-63.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2018. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," Working Papers halshs-01849864, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2021. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," Post-Print halshs-03029892, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," Papers 2012.02662, arXiv.org.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2018. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," PSE Working Papers halshs-01849864, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2021. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03029892, HAL.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2021. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," MPRA Paper 104516, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2020.
"Hopf Bifurcation from New-Keynesian Taylor Rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy,"
EconStor Open Access Articles,
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2017. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," EconStor Preprints 158001, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from New-Keynesian Taylor Rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," Working Papers halshs-01549929, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2017. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," Working Papers hal-01527872, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," Papers 2002.07479, arXiv.org.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from New-Keynesian Taylor Rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," PSE Working Papers halshs-01549929, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard, Chatelain & Kirsten, Ralf, 2017. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," MPRA Paper 79244, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2021.
"Hopf Bifurcation From New-Keynesian Taylor Rule To Ramsey Optimal Policy,"
Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(8), pages 2204-2236, December.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from New-Keynesian Taylor Rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Forthcomi.
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2017. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," EconStor Preprints 158001, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from New-Keynesian Taylor Rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," Working Papers halshs-01549929, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from New-Keynesian Taylor Rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," PSE Working Papers halshs-01549929, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2021. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," Post-Print hal-01527872, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," Papers 2002.07479, arXiv.org.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2021. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01527872, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard, Chatelain & Kirsten, Ralf, 2017. "Hopf Bifurcation from new-Keynesian Taylor rule to Ramsey Optimal Policy," MPRA Paper 79244, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- J. Scott Davis & Ippei Fujiwara & Jiao Wang, 2018. "Dealing with Time Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(7), pages 1369-1399, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
imperfect credibility; monetary policy; sustainable policy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2016-07-02 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2016-07-02 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2016-07-02 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2016-07-02 (Monetary Economics)
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