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Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Armin Schmutzler, 1996. "Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 251-262, April.
  2. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
  3. Peter Kort & Paul Loon & Mikulás Luptácik, 1991. "Optimal dynamic environmental policies of a profit maximizing firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 195-225, October.
  4. Prieger, James E. & Sanders, Nicholas J., 2012. "Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 410-426.
  5. Vislie,J., 2001. "Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership," Memorandum 07/2001, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. Ambec, Stefan & Coria, Jessica, 2021. "The informational value of environmental taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  7. Marcel Boyer & Philippe Mahenc & Michel Moreaux, 2006. "Environmental Protection, Consumers Awareness, Product Characteristics and Market Power," Post-Print hal-02081036, HAL.
  8. Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco, 1992. "Environmental innovation policy and international competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 183-200, March.
  9. Jun Rentschler & Raimund Bleischwitz & Florian Flachenecker, 2018. "On imperfect competition and market distortions: the causes of corporate under-investment in energy and material efficiency," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 159-183, January.
  10. Juan Carlos Bárcena‐Ruiz & María Begoña Garzón, 2022. "Environmental policy instruments and ownership of firms," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(4), pages 385-408, July.
  11. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February.
  12. Ismail Saglam, 2024. "The Bayesian approach to monopoly regulation after 40 years," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 108-136, June.
  13. Lavergne, Pascal & Thomas, A., 1997. "Semiparametric estimation and testing in models of adverse selection, with an aplication to environmental regulation," DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS 6221, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística.
  14. Vislie,J., 2000. "Environmental regulation under asymmetric information with type-dependent outside option," Memorandum 18/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  15. MAHENC Philippe, 2006. "Lemons are Green: The Informative Role of a Pigovian Tax," LERNA Working Papers 06.05.198, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  16. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1993. "Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory Choice," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 275224, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
  17. van Egteren, Henry, 1996. "Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1773-1797, December.
  18. Schmidt, Robert & Pollrich, Martin & Stiel, Caroline, 2013. "An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79741, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  19. Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1996. "Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy," Cahiers de recherche 9604, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  20. Verhoef, Erik T. & Nijkamp, Peter, 1999. "Second-best energy policies for heterogeneous firms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 111-134, April.
  21. Evy Crals & Lode Vereeck, 2005. "Taxes, Tradable Rights and Transaction Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 199-223, September.
  22. Louis Kaplow, 2017. "Optimal Regulation with Exemptions," NBER Working Papers 23887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Philippe Bontems & Jean‐Marc Bourgeon, 2007. "On Environmental Policy and Permitting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 771-792, October.
  24. Benford, Frank A., 1998. "On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, July.
  25. Henry van Egteren, 2002. "Regulating an Externality-Generating Utility Environmental Taxes Under Limited Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(2), pages 107-133, February.
  26. Kaplow, Louis, 2019. "Optimal regulation with exemptions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-39.
  27. Hokkanen, Topi, 2023. "Optimal carbon leakage," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 15/2023, Bank of Finland.
  28. Vislie, Jon, 2003. "Domestic Environmental Policy under Asymmetric Information: The role of foreign ownership, outside options and market power," Memorandum 19/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  29. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1995. "Leading issues in domestic environmental regulation: A review essay," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 23-39, January.
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