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The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2018. "Confronting an enemy with unknown preferences: Deterrer or provocateur?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-143.
  2. Rosete Alfredo R. M., 2018. "Understanding Investor Behavior in the Recent Global Land Rush," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-13, June.
  3. Zsombor Z. M'eder & Carsten K. W. de Dreu & Jorg Gross, 2022. "Equilibria of Attacker-Defender Games," Papers 2202.10072, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  4. David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, 2019. "Measuring rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 49-69, October.
  5. Gründler, Klaus & Hillman, Arye L., 2021. "Ambiguous protection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  6. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
  7. repec:elg:eechap:15325_21 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Benchekroun, Hassan & Long, Ngo Van, 2016. "Status concern and the exploitation of common pool renewable resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 70-82.
  9. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
  10. Pierre Fauvet & Sébastien Rouillon, 2016. "Would you trust lobbies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 201-219, June.
  11. Fernando del Río, 2021. "The impact of rent seeking on social infrastructure and productivity," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 1741-1760, August.
  12. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2015. "A note on Poisson contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 97-102, October.
  13. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
  14. Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014. "Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
  15. Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
  16. Nicolas Houy & Jean-Philippe Nicolaï & Marie Claire Villeval, 2020. "Always doing your best? Effort and performance in dynamic settings," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 249-286, October.
  17. Jean-François Mercier, 2018. "Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 927-947, September.
  18. Long, Ngo Van, 2019. "Financing higher education in an imperfect world," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 23-31.
  19. Rosete, Alfredo, 2015. "Expropriation and the Location of Farmland Investment: a theoretical investigation into the Land Rush," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2015-17, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  20. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Academic exclusion: some experiences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 1-20, April.
  21. Miettinen, Topi & Poutvaara, Panu, 2014. "A market for connections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 37-52.
  22. repec:elg:eechap:15325_12 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2022. "Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(1), pages 227-255, May.
  24. Giuseppe Di Liddo & Annalisa Vinella, 2022. "Asymmetric yardstick competition: traditional procurement versus public-private partnerships," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 8(3), pages 669-695, November.
  25. Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Nicolas Treich, 2017. "Risky rents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 151-164, October.
  26. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "Behavioral Dimensions of Contests," Working Papers 14-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  27. Miettinen, Topi & Poutvaara, Panu, 2015. "Parties as efficiency-improving gatekeepers in rent-seeking societies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 87-101.
  28. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 158-167.
  29. Cole, Matthew T. & Lake, James & Zissimos, Ben, 2021. "Contesting an international trade agreement," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
  30. Toke S. Aidt, 2016. "Rent seeking and the economics of corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 142-157, June.
  31. Ahsan Kibria & Reza Oladi & Sherzod B. Akhundjanov, 2020. "Foreign direct investment and civil violence in Sub‐Saharan Africa," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 948-981, April.
  32. Hessami, Zohal, 2014. "Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 372-389.
  33. Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra & Przemeck, Judith, 2014. "Risk taking and investing in electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 98-120.
  34. Fernando del Río, 2019. "Property Rights, Predation, and Productivity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(3), pages 1154-1188, July.
  35. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
  36. repec:elg:eechap:15325_15 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Grossmann, Martin & Dietl, Helmut, 2015. "Heterogeneous outside options in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 280-287.
  38. repec:elg:eechap:15325_14 is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Krutilla, Kerry & Alexeev, Alexander, 2014. "The Political Transaction Costs and Uncertainties of Establishing Environmental Rights," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 299-309.
  40. repec:elg:eechap:15325_17 is not listed on IDEAS
  41. Guy Elaad & Artyom Jelnov, 2018. "Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 375-387, October.
  42. del Río, Fernando, 2018. "Governance, social infrastructure and productivity," MPRA Paper 86245, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Apr 2018.
  43. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2023. "A master of two servants: lessons from the israeli experience about the effect of separation of powers on public accountability and social welfare," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 59-87, March.
  44. Antoine Pietri, 2017. "Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 307-352.
  45. repec:elg:eechap:15325_6 is not listed on IDEAS
  46. Dong, Zhiqiang & Wang, Xiaobing & Zhang, Tianhua & Zhong, Yuejun, 2022. "The effects of local government leadership turnover on entrepreneurial behavior," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  47. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent Seeking and the Excess Burden of Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 8160, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  48. Pau Balart & Sabine Flamand & Oliver Gürtler & Orestis Troumpounis, 2018. "Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 703-724, October.
  49. repec:elg:eechap:15325_23 is not listed on IDEAS
  50. Mercier, Jean-François, 2018. "Non-deterministic group contest with private information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-53.
  51. Hillman, Arye L. & Long, Ngo V., 2018. "Policies and prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 99-109.
  52. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2020. "A Master of Two Servants: The Effect of Separation of Powers on Public Accountability and Social Welfare," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 10612466, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
  53. Mildenberger, Carl David & Pietri, Antoine, 2018. "How does size matter for military success? Evidence from virtual worlds," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 137-155.
  54. repec:elg:eechap:15325_4 is not listed on IDEAS
  55. Liang, Liang & Chen, Jingxian & Siqueira, Kevin, 2020. "Revenge or continued attack and defense in defender–attacker conflicts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(3), pages 1180-1190.
  56. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2014. "Rents and the Political Economy of Development Aid," Working Papers in Economics 07/14, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  57. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2021. "Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 345-374, December.
  58. repec:elg:eechap:15325_10 is not listed on IDEAS
  59. del Río, Fernando, 2018. "Property Rights, Predation, and Productivity," MPRA Paper 86246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  60. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2017. "Rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 145-166, April.
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