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Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 103-114.
  2. A. Aiche & E. Einy & O. Haimanko & D. Moreno & A. Sela & B. Shitovitz, 2019. "Information in Tullock contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 303-323, May.
  3. Aner Sela, 2020. "Two-Stage Matching Contests," Working Papers 2005, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  4. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2017. "The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 925-942, April.
  5. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
  6. Levi-Tsedek, Netanel & Sela, Aner, 2019. "Sequential (one-against-all) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 9-11.
  7. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  8. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2020. "Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 750-787, September.
  9. Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020. "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  10. Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2022. "Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-20, September.
  11. Cohen, Din & Sela, Aner, 2020. "Common-value group contests with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
  12. Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2023. "The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 841-885, April.
  13. Stefano Barbieri & Iryna Topolyan, 2021. "Private‐information group contests with complementarities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 772-800, October.
  14. Ori Haimanko, 2022. "Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 27-39, May.
  15. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020. "Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 333-345, October.
  16. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  17. Gallice, Andrea, 2017. "An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 673-684.
  18. Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2020. "Assortative Matching Contests," Working Papers 2004, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  19. Aner Sela, 2022. "Status Classification By Lottery Contests," Working Papers 2206, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  20. Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2023. "Optimal seedings in interdependent contests," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 328(2), pages 1263-1285, September.
  21. Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024. "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers 2409, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  22. Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2017. "Cost Shifting in Civil Litigation: A General Theory," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2017-651, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  23. Xu, Jin & Zenou, Yves & Zhou, Junjie, 2022. "Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  24. Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023. "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 348-362.
  25. Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023. "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers 2317, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  26. Barbieri, Stefano & Kovenock, Dan & Malueg, David A. & Topolyan, Iryna, 2019. "Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 382-411.
  27. Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2020. "Cross-shareholdings and competition in a rent-seeking contest," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  28. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2017. "Escalation in Dynamic Conflict: On Beliefs and Selection," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  29. Ori Haimanko, 2021. "Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 1231-1258, April.
  30. Marco Serena, 2022. "Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 763-792, October.
  31. Mercier, Jean-François, 2018. "Non-deterministic group contest with private information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-53.
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