A Market to Implement the Core

Citations

Cited by:

1. Chander, Parkash & Wooders, Myrna, 2020. "Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
   • Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2010. "Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1008, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
2. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Nash program," Working Papers 2007-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
3. Perez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 461-474, April.
   • Perez-Castrillo, D. & Sotomayor, M., 1998. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 421.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
   • David Perez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2000. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0704, Econometric Society.
4. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2012. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 598-612.
   • Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2009. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," MPRA Paper 17606, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2010. "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout," Monash Economics Working Papers 49-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
5. Michael Sattinger, 2003. "Price Dynamics and the Market for Access to Trading Partners," Discussion Papers 03-10, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
6. Messan Agbaglah, 2017. "Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 435-459, March.
   • Messan Agbaglah & Lars Ehlers, 2010. "Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks," Working Papers 2010.116, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
   • Agbaglah, Messan & Ehlers, Lars, 2010. "Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks," Sustainable Development Papers 96628, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
   • Messan Agbaglah, 2014. "Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks," Cahiers de recherche 14-02, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
7. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 292-308, May.
   • Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Working Papers 99-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
8. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November.
9. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2000. "Bargaining, coalitions and competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(2), pages 279-296, March.
   • Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 003, Oscar Volij, revised Jul 1998.
   • Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
   • Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 014, Nir Dagan, revised May 1999.
   • Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, coalitions and competition," Economics Working Papers 178, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
10. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," Working Papers wp2007_0709, CEMFI.
    • Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," Working Papers 2007-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
11. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
    • Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1997. "An Implementation-theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273398, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
12. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2004. "Implementation in the many-to-many matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 199-212, January.
13. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
    • Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
14. Lee, Darin, 1998. "A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 203-208, November.
15. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.
    • Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-16, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
16. Bertrand Tchantcho & Lawrence Diffo Lambo, 2008. "A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 533-542, December.
17. Kucuksenel Serkan, 2011. "Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, September.
18. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    • Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
19. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
    • Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
20. Yasemin Dede & Semih Koray, 2018. "Every member of the core is as respectful as any other," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 55-65, June.
21. Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2008. "Multi-person bargaining with complementarity: Is there holdout?," Discussion Papers 08-10, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
22. Milan Horniaček, 2008. "Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(2), pages 235-249, June.
23. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    • Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
24. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September.
25. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
26. Wood, Peter John, 2010. "Climate Change and Game Theory: a Mathematical Survey," Working Papers 249379, Australian National University, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy.
27. M. Puy, 2013. "Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 65-87, January.
    • M. Socorro Puy, 2009. "Stable Coalition-Governments: The Case of Three Political Parties," Working Papers 2009-3, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
28. Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
    • Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," Discussion Papers 2014-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
29. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 106-120, April.
30. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October.
    • José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina & David Pérez-Castrillo, 1997. "Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
31. Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, 2020. "On the core of auctions with externalities: stability and fairness," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1093-1107, December.
32. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "Incompatibility between stability and consistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 135-137.
33. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
34. Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2003. "A Selling Mechanism," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 57(4), October.