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A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information

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  • Lee, Darin

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  • Lee, Darin, 1998. "A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 203-208, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:61:y:1998:i:2:p:203-208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
    2. Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September.
    3. Nir Dagan, 1994. "Recontracting and competition," Economics Working Papers 152, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 1996.
    4. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
    5. Allen, Beth, 1993. "4. Market Games with Asymmetric Information : Verification and the Publicly Predictable Information Core," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 34(Special I), pages 101-122, December.
    6. Robert Wilson, 2005. "Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 55-64, Springer.
    7. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(2), pages 183-197, April.
    8. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
    9. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
    10. Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    2. Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September.
    3. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.

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