A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
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- Yusuke Kamishiro & Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2022. "Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability," Working Papers 2022-001, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002.
"The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September.
- Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory 005, Oscar Volij.
- Volij, Oscar & Lee, Darin, 2000. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5193, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Oscar Volij & Darin Lee, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Game Theory and Information 9706002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Okada, Akira, 2012.
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Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.
- Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-16, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
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