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Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
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Cited by:
- Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992.
"Noncooperative models of bargaining,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225,
Elsevier.
- Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1990. "Noncooperative Models of Bargaining," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275482, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 2000. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1612, Econometric Society.
- Wasser, Cédric, 2013. "Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 350-368.
- Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989.
"Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
- Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1988. "Stationary Sequential Equilibria in Bargaining With Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 784, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1988. "Efficient Sequential Bargaining," Discussion Papers 804, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Agastya, Murali, 2004.
"Stochastic stability in a double auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 203-222, August.
- Agastya, Murali, 2003. "Stochastic Stability In A Double Auction," Working Papers 5, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour, 2021.
"Redistribution Through Markets,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1665-1698, July.
- Dworczak, Pitor & Kominers, Scott Duke & Akbarpour, Mohammad, 2018. "Redistribution through Markets," Research Papers 3763, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour, 2018. "Redistribution through Markets," Working Papers 2018-037, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Harrison Cheng & Guofu Tan, 2010. "Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 253-290, October.
- Zoë B. Cullen & Bobak Pakzad‐Hurson, 2023. "Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(3), pages 765-802, May.
- Crawford, Vincent P., 2021.
"Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 80-101.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 2021. "Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4748b7r2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Matouschek, Niko & Ramezzana, Paolo & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2004.
"Labour Market Frictions, Job Insecurity and the Flexibility of the Employment Relationship,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4193, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fred Robert-Nicoud (University of Geneva) & Niko Matouschek & Paolo Ramezzana (University of Virginia), 2004. "Labor Market Frictions, Job Insecurity and the Flexibility of the Employment Relationship," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 52, Econometric Society.
- Blumrosen, Liad & Dobzinski, Shahar, 2021. "(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 369-383.
- Ohad Kadan, 2004. "Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values," Working Papers 2004.12, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2022. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 616-649, February.
- Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007.
"Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July.
- Murali Agastya & Flavio Menezes & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000551, David K. Levine.
- Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1987. "Bilateral Trade With The Sealed Bid K-Double Action: Existence And Efficiency," Discussion Papers 723R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bradley J Larsen, 2021.
"The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 851-882.
- Bradley Larsen, 2014. "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," NBER Working Papers 20431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kadan, Ohad, 2006. "So who gains from a small tick size?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 32-66, January.
- Kadan, Ohad, 2007. "Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 495-513, July.
- Duffie, Darrell & Malamud, Semyon & Manso, Gustavo, 2014.
"Information percolation in segmented markets,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 1-32.
- Darrell DUFFIE & Semyon MALAMUD & Gustavo MANSO, 2010. "Information Percolation in Segmented Markets," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 10-09, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Darrell Duffie & Semyon Malamud & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Information Percolation in Segmented Markets," NBER Working Papers 17295, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Saran, Rene, 2011. "Bilateral trading with naive traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 544-557, June.
- Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1988. "The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency In The Buyer's BidDouble Auction As The Market Becomes Large," Discussion Papers 741, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "First-mover disadvantage," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 127, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Duffie, Darrell & Malamud, Semyon & Manso, Gustavo, 2015. "Reprint of: Information percolation in segmented markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 838-869.
- Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July.
- Lu, Hu & Robert, Jacques, 2001. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 50-80, March.