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The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
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Cited by:
- Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993.
"A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.
- Xavier Calsamiglia & Alan Kirman, 1991. "A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes," Economics Working Papers 7, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Agnieszka Lipieta & Andrzej Malawski, 2018. "Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms of Schumpeterian Evolution," Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation, Fundacja Upowszechniająca Wiedzę i Naukę "Cognitione", vol. 14(1), pages 7-28.
- Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2004. "On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 41226, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
- Emilio Carnevali & André Pedersen Ystehede, 2023. "Is socialism back? A review of contemporary economic literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 239-270, April.
- Eric S. Maskin, 2008.
"Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 567-576, June.
- Maskin, Eric S., 2007. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-4, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Eric S. Maskin, 2008. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," Economics Working Papers 0081, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1996.
"A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 237-266.
- Mount, Kenneth R & Reiter, Stanley, 1996. "A Lower Bound on Computational Complexity Given by Revelation Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 237-266, February.
- Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1994. "A Lower Bound on Computational Complexity Given by Revelation Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1085, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Lu Hong & Scott Page, 1994. "Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 103-117, December.
- Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E. & Wurman, Peter R. & MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 2001. "Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 271-303, April.
- Scott E. Page, 2008. "Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 115-149, April.
- Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami, 2015. "An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price-Money Message Mechanism," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 15-31-Rev., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Mar 2016.
- Agnieszka Lipieta & Andrzej Malawski, 2016. "Price versus quality competition: in search for Schumpeterian evolution mechanisms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(5), pages 1137-1171, December.
- Alan Kirman, 2006.
"Demand Theory and General Equilibrium: From Explanation to Introspection, a Journey down the Wrong Road,"
History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 38(5), pages 246-280, Supplemen.
- Alan Kirman, 2006. "Demand Theory and General Equilibrium: From Explanation to Introspection, a Journey down the Wrong Road," Economics Working Papers 0073, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
- Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami, 2015. "An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price-Money Message Mechanism," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 15-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
- Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami, 2016. "Local Independence, Monotonicity and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 16-08, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
- Peter J. Hammond, 2003.
"Equal rights to trade and mediate,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 181-193, October.
- Peter J. Hammond, 1999. "Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate," Working Papers 99019, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
- Kohzo Shiraishi & Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami, 2018. "Stability and Universal Implementability of the Price Mechanism," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-16, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
- Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Georg Ziegler, 2013. "Efficiency with Linear Prices? A Game-Theoretical and Computational Analysis of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(2), pages 394-417, June.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Li, Qi, 1995. "Ratio-Lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership system," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 391-411, May.
- Andreas Blume, 2004. "A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 265-285, November.
- Manjunath, Vikram, 2016. "Fractional matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 321-336.
- Alan Kirman, 2016. "Complexity and Economic Policy: A Paradigm Shift or a Change in Perspective? A Review Essay on David Colander and Roland Kupers's Complexity and the Art of Public Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 534-572, June.
- Scott E. Page, 1998. "Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity," Research in Economics 98-08-076e, Santa Fe Institute.
- Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
- Eric Maskin, 2015. "Friedrich von Hayek and mechanism design," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 247-252, September.
- Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami, 2017. "Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 17-08, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
- Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2001. "The Unique Informational Effciency of the Lindahl Allocation Process in Economies with Public Goods," MPRA Paper 41229, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2005.
- Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kohzo Shiraishi & Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami, 2016. "Universality and Efficiency of Price Mechanism based on an Expansion Possibility of Economies," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 16-10, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.