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Private Bayesian persuasion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators," Papers 2203.04285, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
  2. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
  3. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  5. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  6. Toygar T. Kerman & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos, 2024. "Persuading sincere and strategic voters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
  7. Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2024. "Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design," Papers 2401.03671, arXiv.org.
  8. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
  9. Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev, 2024. "Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp772, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  10. Egor Kravchenko, 2024. "Coherent distributions: Hilbert space approach and duality," Papers 2405.04375, arXiv.org.
  11. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  12. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
  13. Tao Lin & Ce Li, 2024. "Information Design with Unknown Prior," Papers 2410.05533, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
  14. Hahn, Niklas & Hoefer, Martin & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2022. "The secretary recommendation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 199-228.
  15. Kun Heo & Antoine Zerbini, 2024. "Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes," Discussion Papers 2024-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
  16. Tetsuya Hoshino, 2022. "Multi‐Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 755-776, May.
  17. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2024. "Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(1), pages 151-166, January.
  18. Gradwohl, Ronen & Heller, Yuval & Hillman, Arye, 2022. "Social Media and Democracy," MPRA Paper 113609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games," Papers 2107.06312, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
  20. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  21. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 126040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  22. Ronen Gradwohl & Yuval Heller & Arye Hillman, 2022. "Social Media and Democracy," Papers 2206.14430, arXiv.org.
  23. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2021. "Markovian Persuasion," Papers 2111.14365, arXiv.org.
  24. Stanisław Cichomski & Adam Osȩkowski, 2025. "On the Existence of Extreme Coherent Distributions with No Atoms," Journal of Theoretical Probability, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 1-15, March.
  25. Victor Augias & Daniel M. A. Barreto, 2020. "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," Papers 2011.13846, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
  26. Wei, Dong, 2021. "Persuasion under costly learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  27. Shraddha Pathak & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2022. "A Scalable Bayesian Persuasion Framework for Epidemic Containment on Heterogeneous Networks," Papers 2207.11578, arXiv.org.
  28. Daehong Min, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 743-764, October.
  29. Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 0. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  30. Zheng, Shiyuan & Jia, Rongwen & Shang, Wen-Long & Fu, Xiaowen & Wang, Kun, 2023. "Promote transport facility Resilience: Persuasion or Subsidy?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
  31. Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021. "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2285, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  32. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.
  33. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2024. "A population's feasible posterior beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
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