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Private Bayesian persuasion
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Cited by:
- Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2024.
"Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach,"
Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(1), pages 151-166, January.
- Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2022. "Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach," Papers 2208.03758, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Gradwohl, Ronen & Heller, Yuval & Hillman, Arye, 2022. "Social Media and Democracy," MPRA Paper 113609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games," Papers 2107.06312, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
- Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
- Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators," Papers 2203.04285, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
- Ronen Gradwohl & Yuval Heller & Arye Hillman, 2022. "Social Media and Democracy," Papers 2206.14430, arXiv.org.
- Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2021. "Markovian Persuasion," Papers 2111.14365, arXiv.org.
- Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023.
"Informed Information Design,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
- Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Informed Information Design," Working Papers halshs-03107866, HAL.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2022. "Informed Information Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 17028, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Informed Information Design," PSE Working Papers halshs-03107866, HAL.
- Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Victor Augias & Daniel M. A. Barreto, 2020. "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," Papers 2011.13846, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
- Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Persuasion as Transportation," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org.
- Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
- Wei, Dong, 2021. "Persuasion under costly learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
- Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2024. "Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design," Papers 2401.03671, arXiv.org.
- Shraddha Pathak & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2022. "A Scalable Bayesian Persuasion Framework for Epidemic Containment on Heterogeneous Networks," Papers 2207.11578, arXiv.org.
- Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
- Daehong Min, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 743-764, October.
- Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 0. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
- Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev, 2024. "Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp772, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Egor Kravchenko, 2024. "Coherent distributions: Hilbert space approach and duality," Papers 2405.04375, arXiv.org.
- Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
- Zheng, Shiyuan & Jia, Rongwen & Shang, Wen-Long & Fu, Xiaowen & Wang, Kun, 2023. "Promote transport facility Resilience: Persuasion or Subsidy?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
- Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021.
"Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2285, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021. "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Papers 2105.09375, arXiv.org.
- Hahn, Niklas & Hoefer, Martin & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2022. "The secretary recommendation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 199-228.
- Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.
- Kun Heo & Antoine Zerbini, 2024. "Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes," Discussion Papers 2024-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
- Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2024. "A population's feasible posterior beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
- Tetsuya Hoshino, 2022. "Multi‐Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 755-776, May.