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Coherent distributions: Hilbert space approach and duality

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  • Egor Kravchenko

Abstract

Let $X$ be a Bernoulli random variable with the success probability $p$. We are interested in tight bounds on $\mathbb{E}[f(X_1,X_2)]$, where $X_i=\mathbb{E}[X| \mathcal{F}_i]$ and $\mathcal{F}_i$ are some sigma-algebras. This problem is closely related to understanding extreme points of the set of coherent distributions. A distribution on $[0,1]^2$ is called $\textit{coherent}$ if it can be obtained as the joint distribution of $(X_1, X_2)$ for some choice of $\mathcal{F}_i$. By treating random variables as vectors in a Hilbert space, we establish an upper bound for quadratic $f$, characterize $f$ for which this bound is tight, and show that such $f$ result in exposed coherent distributions with arbitrarily large support. As a corollary, we get a tight bound on $\mathrm{cov}\,(X_1,X_2)$ for $p\in [1/3,\,2/3]$. To obtain a tight bound on $\mathrm{cov}\,(X_1,X_2)$ for all $p$, we develop an approach based on linear programming duality. Its generality is illustrated by tight bounds on $\mathbb{E}[|X_1-X_2|^\alpha]$ for any $\alpha>0$ and $p=1/2$.

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  • Egor Kravchenko, 2024. "Coherent distributions: Hilbert space approach and duality," Papers 2405.04375, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2405.04375
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    1. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2019. "Private Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 185-217.
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