Coordination with flexible information acquisition

Citations

Cited by:

1. SangMok Lee, 2022. "Preference Learning in School Choice Problems," Papers 2202.08366, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
2. Jinzhi Lu, 2022. "Limited Attention: Implications for Financial Reporting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(5), pages 1991-2027, December.
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4. Weijie Zhong, 2018. "The Indirect Cost of Information," Papers 1809.00697, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.
5. Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2015. "Information acquisition in global games of regime change," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 387-428.
6. Rigos, Alexandros, 2022. "The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
   • Rigos, Alexandros, 2018. "The Normality Assumption in Coordination Games with Flexible Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2018:30, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Mar 2022.
7. Federico Echenique & Anqi Li, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps," Papers 2212.08219, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
8. Hebert, Benjamin & Woodford, Michael, 2018. "Information Costs and Sequential Information Sampling," Research Papers 3751, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
   • Benjamin Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2018. "Information Costs and Sequential Information Sampling," NBER Working Papers 25316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
9. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
   • Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2022. "First best implementation with costly information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
   • Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
10. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    • Christian König-Kersting & Stefan Trautmann & Razvan Vlahu, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Working Papers 665, DNB.
    • König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2020, Bank of Finland.
    • Koenig-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability : Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Other publications TiSEM b6430e64-50f3-4b4e-a5f3-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
11. Matějka, Filip, 2015. "Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 656-678.
    • Filip Matejka, 2010. "Rigid Pricing and Rationally Inattentive Consumer," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp409, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
12. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling with costly acquisition of signals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 141-150.
    • Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Signaling with Costly Acquisition of Signals," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 100, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
13. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
14. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 226-273, March.
    • Mackowiak, Bartosz & MatÄ›jka, Filip & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2020. "Rational Inattention: A Review," CEPR Discussion Papers 15408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03878692, HAL.
    • Maćkowiak, Bartosz & Matějka, Filip & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2021. "Rational inattention: a review," Working Paper Series 2570, European Central Bank.
    • Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Post-Print hal-03878692, HAL.
15. Baek, Seungjun, 2022. "Optimal policy in lemon markets with flexible information acquisition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
16. Li Hu & Anqi Li, 2018. "The Politics of Attention," Papers 1810.11449, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
17. Cai, Zhifeng & Dong, Feng, 2023. "Public disclosure and private information acquisition: A global game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
18. Baek, Seungjun, 2022. "Information acquisition and asset price volatility," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
19. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023. "The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 187-226, May.
    • Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2018. "Strategic Complexity When Seeking Approval," Research Papers 3615, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2020. "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Impeperfect Information," Research Papers 3885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Vanasco, Victoria & Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana, 2020. "The good, the bad, and the complex: product design with asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 14307, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The good, the bad and the complex: Product design with imperfect information," Economics Working Papers 1643, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2021.
    • Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2021. "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21155, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    • Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The Good, The Bad and The Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," Working Papers 1079, Barcelona School of Economics.
20. Rongyu Wang, 2023. "Bayesian Games with Rationally Inattentive Players," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 35(2), pages 139-171, July.
21. Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 0. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
22. Fu, Wentao & Sun, Yang, 2021. "Rumor investigation in networks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 168-178.
23. Doron Ravid, 2020. "Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2948-2963, September.
24. Mensch, Jeffrey, 2021. "Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
25. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
26. Benjamin Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2017. "Rational Inattention and Sequential Information Sampling," NBER Working Papers 23787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
27. Flynn, Joel P. & Sastry, Karthik A., 2023. "Strategic mistakes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
28. Friedman, Evan, 2020. "Endogenous quantal response equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 620-643.
29. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition," Papers 2204.09250, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
30. Benjamin Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2021. "Neighborhood-Based Information Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3225-3255, October.
    • Benjamin M. Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2020. "Neighborhood-Based Information Costs," NBER Working Papers 26743, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
31. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    • Christian König-Kersting & Stefan Trautmann & Razvan Vlahu, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Working Papers 665, DNB.
    • König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Research Discussion Papers 14/2020, Bank of Finland.
32. Xu Jiang, 2016. "Biases in Accounting and Nonaccounting Information: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 1297-1330, December.
33. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2020. "Communication via intermediaries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 190-203.
34. Annie Liang & Xiaosheng Mu & Vasilis Syrgkanis, 2021. "Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information," Working Papers 2021-43, Princeton University. Economics Department..
35. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2020_014 is not listed on IDEAS
36. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
37. Matějka, Filip & Mackowiak, Bartosz & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2018. "Survey: Rational Inattention, a Disciplined Behavioral Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 13243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
38. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
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40. Luo, Shaowen & Villar, Daniel, 2021. "The price adjustment hazard function: Evidence from high inflation periods," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
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44. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
45. Tommaso Denti & Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2020. "A note on rational inattention and rate distortion theory," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 43(1), pages 75-89, June.
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