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Neighborhood-Based Information Costs

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  • Benjamin Hébert
  • Michael Woodford

Abstract

We derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based cost functions, starting from the observation that many settings involve exogenous states with a topological structure. These cost functions are uniformly posterior separable and capture notions of perceptual distance. This second property ensures that neighborhood-based costs, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior in perceptual experiments. We compare the implications of our neighborhood-based cost functions with those of the mutual information in a series of applications: perceptual judgments, the general environment of binary choice, regime-change games, and linear-quadratic-Gaussian settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2021. "Neighborhood-Based Information Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3225-3255, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:10:p:3225-55
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Luciano Pomatto & Philipp Strack & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs," Papers 1812.04211, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
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    7. Ming Yang, 2020. "Optimality of Debt under Flexible Information Acquisition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(1), pages 487-536.
    8. Michael Woodford, 2014. "An Optimizing Neuroeconomic Model of Discrete Choice," NBER Working Papers 19897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Sims, Christopher A., 2010. "Rational Inattention and Monetary Economics," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 4, pages 155-181, Elsevier.
    10. Ernst Fehr & Antonio Rangel, 2011. "Neuroeconomic Foundations of Economic Choice--Recent Advances," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(4), pages 3-30, Fall.
    11. Hebert, Benjamin & Woodford, Michael, 2017. "Rational Inattention with Sequential Information Sampling," Research Papers repec:ecl:stabus:3457, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    12. Stephen Morris & Ming Yang, 2016. "Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States," Working Papers 079_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    13. Hébert, Benjamin & Woodford, Michael, 2023. "Rational inattention when decisions take time," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    14. Matějka, Filip & Mackowiak, Bartosz & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2018. "Survey: Rational Inattention, a Disciplined Behavioral Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 13243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Yang, Ming, 2015. "Coordination with flexible information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 721-738.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hébert, Benjamin & Woodford, Michael, 2023. "Rational inattention when decisions take time," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    2. Tian, Jianrong, 2024. "Informational separability and entropy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    3. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 226-273, March.
    4. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition," Papers 2204.09250, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    5. Civelli, Andrea & Deck, Cary & Tutino, Antonella, 2022. "Attention and choices with multiple states and actions: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 86-102.
    6. Joshua Bernstein & Rupal Kamdar, 2023. "Rationally Inattentive Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 48, pages 265-296, April.
    7. D'aniel Csaba, 2021. "Attention elasticities and invariant information costs," Papers 2105.07565, arXiv.org.
    8. Hao Li & Junchi Liu & Wei-Yew Chang, 2024. "Influence of Self-Identity and Social Identity on Farmers’ Willingness for Cultivated Land Quality Protection," Land, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-21, August.
    9. Walker-Jones, David, 2023. "Rational inattention with multiple attributes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    10. Flynn, Joel P. & Sastry, Karthik A., 2023. "Strategic mistakes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    11. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2023. "Redeeming Falsifiability?," Papers 2303.15723, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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