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Efficient assignment respecting priorities

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Chen, Siwei & Heo, Eun Jeong, 2021. "Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: Characterizations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 22-30.
  2. Erdil, Aytek, 2014. "Strategy-proof stochastic assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 146-162.
  3. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," Papers 2212.02881, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  4. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2024. "On (constrained) Efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302429, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  5. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2017. "Fair student placement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 293-307, August.
  6. Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
  7. Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Responsive affirmative action in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 69-105.
  8. EHLERS, Lars & WESTKAMP, Alexander, 2011. "Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking," Cahiers de recherche 09-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2012. "Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 2012-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  10. Eun Jeong Heo, 2019. "Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 243-266, March.
  11. Chen, Yajing & Jiao, Zhenhua & Zhang, Yang & Zhao, Fang, 2021. "Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
  12. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Fuhito Kojima & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 729, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Oct 2010.
  14. Han, Xiang, 2024. "On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  15. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2019. "Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 121-142.
  16. Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023. "School choice with preference rank classes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
  17. Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
  18. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
  19. Xiang Han, 2014. "Priority-augmented House Allocation," Departmental Working Papers 1408, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  20. Han, Xiang, 2018. "Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-20.
  21. Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun, 2020. "A market design approach to job rotation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 180-192.
  22. Kumano, Taro, 2017. "Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 230-240.
  23. Rohan Chowdhury, 2023. "A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 287-311, June.
  24. Iwase, Yusuke & Tsuruta, Shoya & Yoshimura, Akina, 2022. "Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 368-379.
  25. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  26. Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020. "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  27. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2014. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 949-966, November.
  28. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 971-987, December.
  29. Erdil, Aytek & Kumano, Taro, 2019. "Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  30. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
  31. Itai Gurvich & Martin A. Lariviere & Can Ozkan, 2019. "Coverage, Coarseness, and Classification: Determinants of Social Efficiency in Priority Queues," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 1061-1075, March.
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