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Dynamic signaling and market breakdown

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kaniel, Ron & Orlov, Dmitry, 2020. "Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects," CEPR Discussion Papers 14586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2017. "Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 2007-2040, July.
  3. Hu, Yunzhi, 2022. "A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  4. Gonzalo Cisternas & Aaron Kolb, 2020. "Signaling with Private Monitoring," Papers 2007.15514, arXiv.org.
  5. Francesc Dilmé & Fei Li, 2016. "Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 57-82, February.
  6. Vladimir Asriyan, 2017. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection," 2017 Meeting Papers 988, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2019. "Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 105-127, July.
  8. Jun, Byoung Heon & Park, In-Uck, 2010. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 51(2), pages 1-22, December.
  9. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
  10. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  11. Asriyan, Vladimir & Fuchs, William & Green, Brett, 2021. "Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  12. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
  13. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-063, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 03 Oct 2013.
  14. Dilmé, Francesc, 2017. "Noisy signaling in discrete time," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 13-25.
  15. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2013. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 13-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  16. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  17. Fuchs, William & Öry, Aniko & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2016. "Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
  18. Bond, Philip & Zhong, Hongda, 2016. "Buying high and selling low: stock repurchases and persistent asymmetric information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67011, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  19. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  20. Yeon-Koo Che & Chongwoo Choe & Keeyoung Rhee, 2015. "Bailout Stigma," Monash Economics Working Papers 26-15, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  21. Reyer Gerlagh & Matti Liski, 2014. "Cake-Eating with Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 5050, CESifo.
  22. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
  23. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
  24. Yunzhi Hu & Felipe Varas, 2021. "A Theory of Zombie Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1813-1867, August.
  25. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li, 2012. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  26. Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2015. "Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 371-406.
  27. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li:, 2012. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-048, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 03 Sep 2013.
  28. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li, 2013. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout Risk, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 24 Apr 2014.
  29. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2009. "Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party," 2009 Meeting Papers 151, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  30. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2012. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 12-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  31. Bond, Philip & Leitner, Yaron, 2015. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 155-167.
  32. Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.
  33. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Hartman-Glaser, Barney, 2019. "Are lemons sold first? Dynamic signaling in the mortgage market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-25.
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