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Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wenjun Ma & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2017. "Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 245-257, August.
  2. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  3. Haisken-DeNew, John & Hasan, Syed & Jha, Nikhil & Sinning, Mathias, 2018. "Unawareness and selective disclosure: The effect of school quality information on property prices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 449-464.
  4. Li, Sanxi & Peitz, Martin & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2016. "Information disclosure and consumer awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 209-230.
  5. Hui Zhang & Qiyu Ren & Jiaying Li, 2019. "How to Improve Water Resources Allocation Efficiency: A Two-Stage Performance-Based Allocation Mechanism," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-12, October.
  6. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2020. "Limited Awareness and Financial Intermediation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 043, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  7. Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
  8. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  9. Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2023. "Opaque Contracts," Papers 2301.13404, arXiv.org.
  10. Antoine Dubus, 2017. "Asymmetric Awareness and Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers hal-01521487, HAL.
  11. Zhongwen Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2023. "Strategic Information Suppression in Borrowing and Pre-Lending Cognition: Theory and Evidence," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-24, May.
  12. Gui, Zhengqing & Huang, Yangguang & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2024. "Financial fraud and investor awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 104-123.
  13. Piermont, Evan, 2017. "Introspective unawareness and observable choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 134-152.
  14. Paulo Fagandini, 2018. "Hunting with two bullets: moral hazard with a second chance," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp629, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
  15. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers 2412.12676, arXiv.org.
  16. Auster, Sarah & Pavoni, Nicola, 2024. "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  17. Karni, Edi & Vierø, Marie-Louise, 2017. "Awareness of unawareness: A theory of decision making in the face of ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 301-328.
  18. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2022. "Conditional dominance in games with unawareness," Working Papers 351, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  19. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2021. "Unawareness without AU Introspection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  20. Antoine Dubus, 2020. "Asymmetric awareness and heterogeneous agents," Rationality and Society, , vol. 32(4), pages 461-484, November.
  21. Nicola Pavoni & Sarah Auster, 2016. "Optimal Delegation, Unawareness, and Financial Intermediation," 2016 Meeting Papers 1106, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  22. Canidio, Andrea & Karle, Heiko, 2022. "The focusing effect in negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 1-20.
  23. Evan Piermont, 2023. "Iterated Revelation: How to Incentive Experts to Complete Incomplete Contracts," Papers 2304.05142, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  24. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2018. "Optimal Delegation and Limited Awareness, with an Application to Financial Intermediation," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1869, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  25. Pamela Giustinelli & Nicola Pavoni, 2017. "The Evolution of Awareness and Belief Ambiguity in the Process of High School Track Choice," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 25, pages 93-120, April.
  26. Pamela Giustinelli & Nicola Pavoni, 2016. "The Evolution of Awareness and Belief Ambiguity During the Process of High School Track Choice," Working Papers 574, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  27. Gaia Belardinelli & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2023. "Implicit Knowledge in Unawareness Structures," Working Papers 360, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  28. Surajeet Chakravarty & David Kelsey & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2020. "Operationalizing Reverse Bayesianism," Discussion Papers 2020-18, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  29. Zhengqing Gui & Yangguang Huang & Xiaojian Zhao, 2018. "Whom to Educate? Financial Fraud and Investor Awareness," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2018-52, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Jan 2018.
  30. Surajeet Chakravarty & David Kelsey & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2018. "Tort Liability and Unawareness," Discussion Papers 1801, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  31. Wenjun Ma & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2017. "Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 245-257, August.
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