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Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-314, May.
  2. Eduardo Perez, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03583828, HAL.
  3. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  4. Liang Guo, 2021. "Partial Unraveling and Strategic Contract Timing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7719-7736, December.
  5. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
  6. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  7. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  9. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008. "Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
  10. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
  11. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Working Papers hal-03770685, HAL.
  12. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  13. Mathis, Jérôme, 2008. "Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 571-584, November.
  14. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
  15. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
  16. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
  18. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03770685, HAL.
  19. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
  20. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  21. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1447-1454.
  22. Ryan, Matthew & Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2011. "Verifiability and neologism-proofness in a Sender-Receiver game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 256-262, August.
  23. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
  24. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020. "Manipulative Disclosure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1250, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  25. Miura, Shintaro, 2019. "Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 306-338.
  26. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Debdatta Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2018. "Coordination and Private Information Revelation," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-21, September.
  28. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2011. "How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 447-474, April.
  29. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-04821601 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  31. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12406 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03770685, HAL.
  34. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  35. Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019. "Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
  36. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
  37. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  38. repec:hal:journl:hal-04821601 is not listed on IDEAS
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