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Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members

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Cited by:

  1. Hanqing “Chevy” Fang & Kulraj Singh & Taewoo Kim & Laura Marler & James J. Chrisman, 2022. "Family business research in Asia: review and future directions," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 1215-1256, December.
  2. Amit, Raphael & Ding, Yuan & Villalonga, Belén & Zhang, Hua, 2015. "The role of institutional development in the prevalence and performance of entrepreneur and family-controlled firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 284-305.
  3. Wu, Sihong & Chirico, Francesco & Fan, Di & Ding, Jiayan & Su, Yiyi, 2024. "Foreign market exit in family firms: Do historical military and cultural frictions matter?," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(1).
  4. Tzu-Ching Weng & Kai-Jui Hsu & Tzu-Hsuan Kuo, 2023. "Family Succession and Quality of Financial Information: Evidence from China," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 13(3), pages 1-4.
  5. Giuseppe Danese, 2021. "Divine Kingship in the Firm: Reciprocity, Organizational Culture, and Founder Cults," Annals of the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Economics, History and Political Science, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino (Italy), vol. 55(1), pages 217-236, June.
  6. Tasawar Nawaz, 2022. "How Much Does the Board Composition Matter? The Impact of Board Gender Diversity on CEO Compensation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(18), pages 1-15, September.
  7. Xu, Hongmei, 2015. "Corporate governance, state ownership and cross-listing: Evidence from Chinese A-share listed firms," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 2/2015, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  8. Xibo Zhao & Dan Yang & Zhengguang Li & Lynda Song, 2021. "Multiple large shareholders and corporate fraud: evidence from China," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 1-21, December.
  9. Fang, Yuanli & Hu, Maggie & Yang, Qingsen, 2018. "Do executives benefit from shareholder disputes? Evidence from multiple large shareholders in Chinese listed firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 275-315.
  10. Zheng, Panting & Wang, Shengnian, 2024. "Can multiple major shareholders reduce the probability of listed firms receiving inquiries from stock exchanges? Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  11. Gregorio Sánchez-Marín & Antonio J. Carrasco-Hernández & Ignacio Danvila-del-Valle, 2020. "Effects of family involvement on the monitoring of CEO compensation," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 1347-1366, December.
  12. Song, Siwen & Jun, Aelee & Luo, Tianpei & Ma, Shiguang, 2024. "Political legitimacy and CSR reporting: Evidence from non-SOEs in China," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  13. Manika Kohli, 2018. "Impact of Ownership Type and Board Characteristics on the Pay–Performance Relationship: Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 11(1), pages 1-34, June.
  14. Astami, Emita & Pramono, Agus Joko & Rusmin, Rusmin & Cahaya, Fitra Roman & Soobaroyen, Teerooven, 2024. "Do family ownership and supervisory board characteristics influence audit report lag? A view from a two-tier board context," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  15. Wu, Wenxin & Zhang, Xuezhi & Zhou, Zixun, 2022. "Institutional investors' corporate site visits and pay-performance sensitivity," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
  16. Talavera, Oleksandr & Yin, Shuxing & Zhang, Mao, 2021. "Tournament incentives, age diversity and firm performance," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 139-162.
  17. Wu, Ying & Chang, Qi, 2024. "Large state-owned shareholders and cash holding: Evidence from family firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  18. Xu, Tianli & Xu, Longbing & Zhu, Siyuan, 2023. "Common ownership and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  19. Nindhita Nisrina Sari & Siti Nuryanah, 2024. "The role of shareholders in controlling tax avoidance: evidence from ASEAN countries," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(3), pages 421-432, September.
  20. Dan Zhang & Shiguang Ma & Xiaofei Pan, 2021. "Institutional investors, controlling shareholders and CEO pay‐performance relationship: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(1), pages 467-498, March.
  21. Song, Siwen & Jun, Aelee & Ma, Shiguang, 2021. "Corruption exposure, political disconnection, and their impact on Chinese family firms," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3).
  22. Zhijun Lin & Qidi Zhang & Chuyao Deng, 2024. "Multiple Large Shareholders and ESG Performance: Evidence from Shareholder Friction," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(15), pages 1-28, July.
  23. Barontini, Roberto & Bozzi, Stefano, 2018. "Family firm heterogeneity and CEO compensation in Continental Europe," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 1-18.
  24. Dumitru-Nicusor CARAUSU, 2015. "Monitor And Control In Companies: An Agency Theory Approach," Journal of Public Administration, Finance and Law, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 0(Special i), pages 46-60, September.
  25. Rongli Yuan & Yadong Han & Zhanliao Chen, 2023. "Multiple Large Shareholders and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from China," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(1), pages 197-229, March.
  26. Han, Han & Wang, Zhibin & Zhao, Xueqing, 2023. "Minority shareholder activism, threat of exit and pay-performance sensitivity," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
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