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Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Giorgio Gronchi & Elena Parilina & Alessandro Tampieri, 2021. "Plenty of Fish in the Sea: Divorce Choice and the Quality of Singles," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(23), pages 1-33, November.
  2. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2018. "Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 129, pages 127-144.
  3. Ettore Damiano & Li Hao, 2008. "Competing Matchmaking," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 789-818, June.
  4. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
  5. E. M. Parilina & A. Tampieri, 2013. "Marriage Formation with Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem," Working Papers wp886, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  6. Echenique, Federico & Pereyra, Juan Sebastián, 2016. "Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  7. Frederick Chen, 2003. "Unraveling in a dynamic matching market with Nash bargaining," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(17), pages 1-6.
  8. Kei Kawakami, 2024. "Disclosure services and welfare gains in matching markets for indivisible assets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(3), pages 485-532, September.
  9. De Fraja, Gianni & Sákovics, József, 2012. "Exclusive nightclubs and lonely hearts columns: Non-monotone participation in optional intermediation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 618-632.
  10. Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79-112.
  11. Marie-Pierre Dargnies & Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2019. "Self-Confidence and Unraveling in Matching Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5603-5618, December.
  12. Ambuehl, Sandro & Groves, Vivienne, 2020. "Unraveling over time," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 252-264.
  13. Shapiro, Joel & Josephson, Jens, 2008. "Interviews and Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 6837, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Halaburda, Hanna, 2010. "Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 365-393, July.
  15. Wu, Mingqin & Chen, Bin, 2016. "Assignment of provincial officials based on economic performance: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 60-75.
  16. Fainmesser, Itay P., 2013. "Social networks and unraveling in labor markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 64-103.
  17. Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 479-494.
  18. Okudaira, Hiroko, 2020. "Regulating the timing of job search: evidence from the labor market for new college graduates," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  19. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 2015. "Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 599-629, August.
  20. Jonathan M.V. Davis, 2017. "The Short and Long Run Impacts of Centralized Clearinghouses: Evidence from Matching Teach For America Teachers to Schools," 2017 Papers pda791, Job Market Papers.
  21. Yuhta Ishii & Aniko Ory & Adrien Vigier, 2018. "Competing for Talent," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2119, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  22. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2007. "Price discrimination and efficient matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 243-263, February.
  23. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2013. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(2), pages 1-40, June.
  24. Yann Bramoullé & Brian W. Rogers & Erdem Yenerdag, 2022. "Matching with Recall," AMSE Working Papers 2203, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
  25. Benjamin N. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3694-3713, June.
  26. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
  27. Lam, Wing Tung, 2020. "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  28. Yuhta Ishii & Aniko Ory & Adrien Vigier, 2018. "Competing for Talent," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 3019, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  29. Garth Baughman, 2016. "Deadlines and Matching," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  30. Burhan, Nik Ahmad Sufian & Sidek, Abdul Halim & Kurniawan, Yohan & Mohamad, Mohd Rosli, 2014. "Has Globalization Triggered Collective Impact of National Intelligence on Economic Growth?," MPRA Paper 77316, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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