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Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Generalized Informativeness Principle," NBER Working Papers 20729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Fagart, Marie-Cécile & Fluet, Claude, 2013. "The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 7-16.
  3. Ethan Ligon & Pierre Dubois, 2012. "Incentives & Nutrition for Rotten Kids: The Quantity & Quality of Food Allocated within Philippine Households," 2012 Meeting Papers 375, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Luigi Iovino, 2012. "Sophisticated Intermediation and Aggregate Volatility," 2012 Meeting Papers 965, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Nasri, Mostafa & Bastin, Fabian & Marcotte, Patrice, 2015. "Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 245(1), pages 226-235.
  6. Clausen, Andrew, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  7. Guillaume Roger, 2016. "A Revelation Mechanism for Soft Information under Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(5), pages 752-763, October.
  8. Guillaume Roger, 2013. "Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 55-80, November.
  9. Jung, Jin Yong & Kim, Son Ku, 2015. "Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 243-279.
  10. Chi, Chang Koo & Olsen, Trond E., 2018. "Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 7/2018, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
  11. Ewerhart, Christian, 2016. "An envelope approach to tournament design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.
  12. Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2013. "On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2313-2343.
  13. Cai, W. & Singham, D.I., 2018. "A principal–agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(1), pages 239-256.
  14. Ohad Kadan & Philip J. Reny & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2017. "Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal‐Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 769-823, May.
  15. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 93-117.
  16. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
  17. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  18. Huang, Pidong, 2013. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance With Different Types of Job," MPRA Paper 46626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Chang Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2022. "A Dual Approach To Agency Problems: Existence," Working papers 2022rwp-197, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  20. Roger, Guillaume, 2016. "Participation in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 10-24.
  21. Jia Xie, 2017. "Information, Risk Sharing, And Incentives In Agency Problems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(1), pages 157-182, February.
  22. Dominique Henriet & Patrick A. Pintus & Alain Trannoy, 2014. "Is the Flat Tax Optimal under Income Risk?," Working Papers halshs-00999222, HAL.
  23. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Contracting with private rewards," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 589-612, June.
  24. Chade, Hector & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2020. "The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
  25. Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2024. "Player Strength and Effort in Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 285, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  26. Ábrahám, Árpád & Koehne, Sebastian & Pavoni, Nicola, 2011. "On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1331-1361, July.
  27. Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023. "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 375-416, August.
  28. Li, Zhaolin, 2020. "Robust Moral Hazard with Distributional Ambiguity," Working Papers BAWP-2020-03, University of Sydney Business School, Discipline of Business Analytics.
  29. Jia Xie, 2015. "Information, Risk Sharing and Incentives in Agency Problems," Staff Working Papers 15-7, Bank of Canada.
  30. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2018. "Adversarial Persuasion with Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 1811, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
  31. Hwang, Sunjoo, 2016. "Relational contracts and the first-order approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 126-130.
  32. Chi, Chang Koo & Choi, Kyoung Jin, 2023. "A dual approach to agency problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  33. Balmaceda, Felipe & Balseiro, Santiago R. & Correa, José R. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2016. "Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 137-155.
  34. Kirkegaard, René, 2017. "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 373-387.
  35. Jung, Jin Yong, 2022. "Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  36. Chu, Xiang & Liu, Jun & Ren, Long & Gong, Daqing, 2020. "Optimal contract design with a common agency in last-mile logistics," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
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