A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

Citations

Cited by:

1. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
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   • Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1109, Econometric Society.
   • Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 200010, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
   • Ignatius J. Horstmann & Kimberley A. Scharf, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 200011, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
4. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
   • Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.
   • Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812781, HAL.
5. Francesc Dilmé, 2023. "Sequentially Stable Outcomes," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 254, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
   • Francesc Dilmé, 2024. "Sequentially Stable Outcomes," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_511, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
6. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023. "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
7. Facundo Albornoz & Joan-Maria Esteban & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Government Information Transparency," Working Papers 392, Barcelona School of Economics.
   • Joan Esteban & Facundo Albornoz & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Government Information Transparency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 774.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 10 Feb 2010.
   • Facundo Albornoz & Joan Esteban & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Government Information Transparency," Discussion Papers 09-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
8. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
   • Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
9. Sun, Lan, 2016. "Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 557, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
10. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    • Yusuke Kamishiro & Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2022. "Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability," Working Papers 2022-001, Brown University, Department of Economics.
11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
12. Francesc Dilmé, 2024. "Sequentially Stable Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(4), pages 1097-1134, July.
13. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Ravid, S. Abraham, 1999. "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Myopia, and Capital Gains Tax Rates: An Analysis of Policy Prescriptions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 205-231, July.
14. John C. Persons, "undated". "Fully Revealing Equilibria with Suboptimal Investment," Research in Financial Economics 9507, Ohio State University.
15. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
16. Benjamin Hébert, 2018. "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2214-2252.
    • Benjamin Hébert, 2014. "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," Working Paper 145746, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    • Hebert, Benjamin, 2015. "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," Research Papers 3455, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
17. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
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18. Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
19. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
    • Ayça Kaya, 2005. "Repeated Signaling Games," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
20. Perea, Andrés, 2017. "Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 489-516.
21. Feng, Hong & Fu, Qiang & Zhang, Lan, 2020. "How to Launch a New Durable Good: A Signaling Rationale for Hunger Marketing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
22. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2009. "The Perverse Effects of Outside Options on Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 210-229, June.
23. Kjell Hausken, 1997. "Game-theoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(6), pages 511-528, December.
24. Huang, Xuesong, 2024. "Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
25. Chlaß, Nadine & Perea, Andrés, 2016. "How do people reason in dynamic games?," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145881, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
26. Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
27. Persons, John C., 2000. "Fully revealing equilibria with suboptimal investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 331-344, September.