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Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision
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Cited by:
- Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022.
"Optimal Random Taxation and Redistribution,"
SciencePo Working papers Main
hal-03915336, HAL.
- Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal random taxation and redistribution," IFS Working Papers W22/35, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal Random Taxation and Redistribution," Working Papers hal-03915336, HAL.
- Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Collin Raymond & David B. Huffman, 2023.
"Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
10541, CESifo.
- Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Colin Raymond, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," Economics Series Working Papers 1012, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Brice Corgnet & Simon Gaechter & Roberto Hernan Gonzalez, 2020.
"Working Too Much for Too Little: Stochastic Rewards Cause Work Addiction,"
Discussion Papers
2020-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Corgnet, Brice & Gächter, Simon & González, Roberto Hernán, 2020. "Working Too Much for Too Little: Stochastic Rewards Cause Work Addiction," IZA Discussion Papers 12992, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Brice Corgnet & Simon Gaechter & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Working too much for too little: stochastic rewards cause work addiction," Working Papers halshs-02483337, HAL.
- Brice Corgnet & Simon Gaechter & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Working too much for too little: stochastic rewards cause work addiction," Working Papers 2007, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Brice Corgnet & Simon Gaechter & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Working Too Much for Too Little: Stochastic Rewards Cause Work Addiction," Working Papers 20-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Boleslavsky, Raphael & Taylor, Curtis R., 2024. "Make it 'til you fake it," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Andr's Gonz'lez Lira & Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, 2018.
"Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2143R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2021.
- Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, 2021. "Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt," NBER Working Papers 28610, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021.
"A solution to the two-person implementation problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," PSE Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print hal-03498370, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print halshs-03342559, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03342559, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
- Matthias Lang, 2023.
"Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
- Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
- Lang, Matthias, 2022. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 329, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2019.
"Paid to Quit,"
De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 387-406, December.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2013. "Paid to Quit," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-174/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Dec 2015.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2015. "Paid to Quit," CESifo Working Paper Series 5648, CESifo.
- David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
- Douglas H. Frank & Tomasz Obloj, 2014. "Firm‐specific human capital, organizational incentives, and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(9), pages 1279-1301, September.
- Maxim Ivanov, 2024. "Perfect robust implementation by private information design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 753-787, November.
- Hogarth, Robin M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014.
"Ambiguous incentives and the persistence of effort: Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-19.
- Robin M. Hogarth & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Ambiguous incentives and the persistence of effort: Experimental evidence," Post-Print halshs-01098750, HAL.
- Robin M. Hogarth & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Ambiguous Incentives and the Persistence of Effort : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 1432, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González, 2019.
"Revisiting the Trade-off Between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks?,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 1096-1114, March.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González, 2015. "Revisiting the Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks," Working Papers 15-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez, 2019. "Revisiting the Trade-off Between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks?," Post-Print halshs-01937875, HAL.
- Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2018.
"Strategic Complexity When Seeking Approval,"
Research Papers
3615, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2021. "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21155, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2020. "The good, the bad, and the complex: product design with asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 14307, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The good, the bad and the complex: Product design with imperfect information," Economics Working Papers 1643, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2021.
- Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2020. "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Impeperfect Information," Research Papers 3885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The Good, The Bad and The Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," Working Papers 1079, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Frances Xu Lee & Wing Suen, 2023. "Gaming A Selective Admissions System," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(1), pages 413-443, February.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023.
"The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 187-226, May.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The Good, The Bad and The Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," Working Papers 1079, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2021. "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21155, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2020. "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Impeperfect Information," Research Papers 3885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The good, the bad and the complex: Product design with imperfect information," Economics Working Papers 1643, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2021.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán González, 2023. "You Will not Regret it: On the Practice of Randomized Incentives," Working Papers 2314, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2019. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives and Plan Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2199R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2021.
- Víctor González-Jiménez, 2021. "Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities," Vienna Economics Papers vie2101, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2023. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1055-1095, April.
- Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2023. "What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3578-3601, June.
- Daniel Quigley & Ansgar Walther, 2024. "Inside and Outside Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(4), pages 2667-2714, August.
- Lamar Pierce & Alex Rees-Jones & Charlotte Blank, 2020. "The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives," NBER Working Papers 26619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Abeler, Johannes & Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 16284, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Chugunova, Marina & Sele, Daniela, 2022. "We and It: An interdisciplinary review of the experimental evidence on how humans interact with machines," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
- Barron, Daniel & Georgiadis, George & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2020. "Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
- Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Víctor González-Jiménez, 2021. "Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities," Vienna Economics Papers 2101, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2022. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Incentives, Private Information, and Job Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4602-4630, June.
- Breu, Maximilian, 2017. "Focusing Attention in Multiple Tasks," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168264, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Lorán Chollete & Sharon G. Harrison, 2021. "Unintended Consequences: Ambiguity Neglect and Policy Ineffectiveness," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 206-226, April.