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Empirical Tests of a Principal-Agent Model of the Investor-Investment Advisor Relationship

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Cited by:

  1. Jiří Šindelář & Petr Budinský, 2018. "Agent-zákazník problém v distribuci finančních produktů [Agent-Principal Problem in Financial Distribution]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(4), pages 491-507.
  2. Raphaëlle Bellando, 2008. "Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille : une revue de littérature," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(3), pages 317-339.
  3. Najand, Mohammad & Prather, Larry J., 1999. "The risk level discriminatory power of mutual fund investment objectives: Additional evidence," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 307-328, August.
  4. Dirk P.M. De Wit, 1993. "Smoothing Bias in In-House Appraisal-Based Returns of Open-End Real Estate Funds," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 8(2), pages 157-170.
  5. Bai, Zefeng, 2021. "Does robo-advisory help reduce the likelihood of carrying a credit card debt? Evidence from an instrumental variable approach," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C).
  6. Casavecchia, Lorenzo, 2016. "Fund managers' herding and the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 205-221.
  7. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Mohebshahedin, Mahmood, 2020. "Transparency and fund governance efficacy: The effect of the SEC'S disclosure rule on advisory contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
  8. Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 1998. "Fee Speech: Adverse Selection and the Regulation of Mutual Funds," NBER Working Papers 6644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Lütje, Torben, 2004. "To Be Good or To Be Better: Asset Managers Attitudes Towards Herding," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-297, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  10. Raimond Maurer, 1998. "Risikoanreize bei der Gestaltung erfolgsabhängiger Entlohnungssysteme für Kapitalanlagegesellschaften," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 50(6), pages 507-530, June.
  11. Palomino, F.A. & Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 1999. "Should smart investors buy funds with high returns in the past," Discussion Paper 1999-69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Lonnie L. Bryant & Maureen Butler & Zhongling Cao, 2018. "Mutual Fund Fee Structures and Broker Compensation," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 197-211, May.
  13. Joanne K. Yoong & Angela Hung, 2009. "Self-Dealing and Compensation for Financial Advisors," Working Papers 713, RAND Corporation.
  14. Shaw, Frances & Dunne, Peter G., 2017. "Investment Fund Risk: The Tale in the Tails," Research Technical Papers 01/RT/17, Central Bank of Ireland.
  15. Joanne K. Yoong & Angela A. Hung, 2009. "Self-Dealing and Compensation for Financial Advisors," Working Papers WR-713, RAND Corporation.
  16. Shujing Li & Jiaping Qiu, 2014. "Financial Product Differentiation over the State Space in the Mutual Fund Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(2), pages 508-520, February.
  17. Fulkerson, Jon A. & Hong, Xin, 2021. "Investment restrictions and fund performance," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 317-336.
  18. Connie Becker & Wayne Ferson & David Myers & Michael Schill, 1998. "Conditional Market Timing with Benchmark Investors," NBER Working Papers 6434, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Roberto Liebscher & Thomas Mählmann, 2017. "Are Professional Investment Managers Skilled? Evidence from Syndicated Loan Portfolios," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(6), pages 1892-1918, June.
  20. Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon & King, Stephen P., 1999. "On relative performance contracts and fund manager's incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 135-161, January.
  21. Loranth Gyongyi & Sciubba Emanuela, 2006. "Relative Performance, Risk and Entry in the Mutual Fund Industry," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, September.
  22. Smaby, Timothy R. & Fizel, John L., 1995. "Fund closings as a signal to investors: Investment performance of open-end mutual funds that close to new shareholders," Financial Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 71-80.
  23. Philipp Nussbaumer & Inu Matter & Gian Reto à Porta & Gerhard Schwabe, 2012. "Designing for Cost Transparency in Investment Advisory Service Encounters," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 4(6), pages 347-361, December.
  24. Casavecchia, Lorenzo & Hulley, Hardy, 2018. "Are mutual fund investors paying for noise?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 8-23.
  25. Ching-Chang Wang & Jerry Yu, 2018. "The holdings markup behavior of mutual funds: evidence from an emerging market," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 393-414, February.
  26. Giambona, Erasmo & Golec, Joseph, 2009. "Mutual fund volatility timing and management fees," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 589-599, April.
  27. Ana C. Díaz†Mendoza & Germán López†Espinosa & Miguel A. Martínez, 2014. "The Efficiency of Performance†Based Fee Funds," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), pages 825-855, September.
  28. Costas Siriopoulos & Maria Skaperda, 2020. "Investing in mutual funds: are you paying for performance or for the ties of the manager?," Bulletin of Applied Economics, Risk Market Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 153-164.
  29. Song, Ziyu & Wu, Shan, 2023. "Post financial forecasting game theory and decision making," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PA).
  30. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2004. "Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Precise Information in Delegated Portfolio Management," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 25(1), pages 25-36, February.
  31. Agarwal, Vikas & Gómez, Juan-Pedro & Priestley, Richard, 2012. "Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1600-1625.
  32. Golec, Joseph & Starks, Laura, 2004. "Performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 93-118, July.
  33. Gong Zhan, 2011. "Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 205-239, July.
  34. Cumming, Douglas & Johan, Sofia & Zhang, Yelin, 2019. "What is mutual fund flow?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 222-251.
  35. Clifford, Christopher P., 2008. "Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 323-336, September.
  36. Daniel N. Deli, 2002. "Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 109-133, February.
  37. Joseph T.L. Ooi, 2010. "The compensation structure of REIT managers: impact on stock valuation and performance," Journal of Property Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(4), pages 309-328, May.
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