IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/jpropr/v26y2010i4p309-328.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The compensation structure of REIT managers: impact on stock valuation and performance

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph T.L. Ooi

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of managers' compensation structure on initial public offering (IPO) pricing and the subsequent corporate performance of 20 externally‐managed real estate investment trusts (REITs) listed on the Singapore Exchange. The results indicate that the IPO market is somewhat efficient in pricing potential moral hazard problems arising from the way REIT managers are paid. In particular, we find that the market generally rewards REITs that pay their managers a low base fee coupled with a high incentive fee that is benchmarked against a pre‐determined performance level. When tracking the post‐IPO performance of the individual REITs, we find that it is related negatively to the size of the base fee, but positively to the performance‐based fee. We also find weak evidence that the incentive‐based fee that is benchmarked against a pre‐determined hurdle leads to superior performance by the managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph T.L. Ooi, 2010. "The compensation structure of REIT managers: impact on stock valuation and performance," Journal of Property Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(4), pages 309-328, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jpropr:v:26:y:2010:i:4:p:309-328
    DOI: 10.1080/09599916.2009.485416
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09599916.2009.485416
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09599916.2009.485416?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael C. Jensen, 1968. "The Performance Of Mutual Funds In The Period 1945–1964," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(2), pages 389-416, May.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Ritter, Jay R, 1984. "The "Hot Issue" Market of 1980," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 215-240, April.
    5. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1997. "Does It All Add Up? Benchmarks and the Compensation of Active Portfolio Managers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(3), pages 323-350, July.
    6. Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber & Christopher R. Blake, 2003. "Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 779-804, April.
    7. Ling, David C. & Ryngaert, Michael, 1997. "Valuation uncertainty, institutional involvement, and the underpricing of IPOs: The case of REITs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 433-456, March.
    8. Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 2002. "Fee Speech: Signaling, Risk-Sharing, and the Impact of Fee Structures on Investor Welfare," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(5), pages 1465-1497.
    9. Dennis R. Capozza & Paul J. Seguin, 1998. "Managerial Style and Firm Value," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 131-150, March.
    10. van Bommel, Jos, 2002. "Messages from market to management: the case of IPOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 123-138, March.
    11. Stulz, ReneM. & Johnson, Herb, 1985. "An analysis of secured debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 501-521, December.
    12. Golec, Joseph H., 1992. "Empirical Tests of a Principal-Agent Model of the Investor-Investment Advisor Relationship," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 81-95, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ana C. Díaz†Mendoza & Germán López†Espinosa & Miguel A. Martínez, 2014. "The Efficiency of Performance†Based Fee Funds," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), pages 825-855, September.
    2. Agarwal, Vikas & Gómez, Juan-Pedro & Priestley, Richard, 2012. "Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1600-1625.
    3. Markus Ibert & Ron Kaniel & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Roine Vestman, 2018. "Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(2), pages 715-772.
    4. Agarwal, Vikas & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naik, Narayan Y., 2009. "Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance," CFR Working Papers 04-04, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    5. Marguerite Schneider, 2000. "When Financial Intermediaries are Corporate Owners: An Agency Model of Institutional Ownership," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 4(3), pages 207-237, September.
    6. Livio Stracca, 2006. "Delegated Portfolio Management: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 823-848, December.
    7. Fouad Jamaani & Manal Alidarous, 2019. "Review of Theoretical Explanations of IPO Underpricing," Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, Scientific Publishing Institute, vol. 6(1), pages 1-18.
    8. Cumming, Douglas & Johan, Sofia & Zhang, Yelin, 2019. "What is mutual fund flow?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 222-251.
    9. Daniel N. Deli, 2002. "Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 109-133, February.
    10. Helen Short & Kevin Keasey & Darren Duxbury, 2002. "Capital Structure, Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 375-399.
    11. Sotes-Paladino, Juan & Zapatero, Fernando, 2022. "Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    12. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    13. Michel, Allen & Oded, Jacob & Shaked, Israel, 2014. "Ownership structure and performance: Evidence from the public float in IPOs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 54-61.
    14. Malik Muhammad Shehr Yar & Attiya Yasmin Javid, 2014. "Liquidity Benefits From Underpricing: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings Listed at Karachi Stock Exchange," PIDE-Working Papers 2014:101, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    15. Joanne K. Yoong & Angela A. Hung, 2009. "Self-Dealing and Compensation for Financial Advisors," Working Papers WR-713, RAND Corporation.
    16. Ayub Mehar, 2005. "Is debt a substitute of equity? Relevancy of financial policy in current economic scenarios," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(5), pages 337-366.
    17. Patrick Artus & Philippe Ducos & Francois Lecointe, 1992. "Rachats d'entreprise avec endettement (LBO et MBO) : motivations micro-économiques, effets sur l'efficacité des entreprises et risques macro-économiques," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 102(1), pages 89-104.
    18. Nuria Alcalde Fradejas & Manuel Espitia Escuer & Jaime Vallés Giménez, "undated". "El mercado para el control de empresas en Espana. Identificación de las empresas objetivo de OPA," Studies on the Spanish Economy 159, FEDEA.
    19. Clifford, Christopher P., 2008. "Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 323-336, September.
    20. Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M., 2010. "Active portfolio management with benchmarking: A frontier based on alpha," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 2185-2197, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:jpropr:v:26:y:2010:i:4:p:309-328. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RJPR20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.