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A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 751-774, October.
  2. Bodea, Cristina & Higashijima, Masaaki, 2017. "Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 47-70, January.
  3. Barta, Zsófia & Baccaro, Lucio & Johnston, Alison, 2022. "Signaling virtue or vulnerability? The changing impact of exchange rate regimes on government bond yields," MPIfG Discussion Paper 22/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  4. Carsten Hefeker, 2019. "Political polarization, term length and too much delegation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 50-69, March.
  5. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  6. Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, 2006. "The Independence of International Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(2), pages 253-275, April.
  7. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  8. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  9. Beichen HUANG & Tianyang XI & Jiajun XU, 2020. "Checks and balance, Political Leadership, and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Evidence from National Development Banks," Working Paper 6fb72d50-b8e9-40a3-9021-8, Agence française de développement.
  10. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  11. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
  12. Manuela Moschella & Luca Pinto, 2022. "The multi‐agencies dilemma of delegation: Why do policymakers choose one or multiple agencies for financial regulation?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1250-1264, October.
  13. Philip Keefer & David Stasavage, 1998. "When does delegation improve credibility? Central Bank independence and the separation of powers," CSAE Working Paper Series 1998-18, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  14. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Karl Kaltenthaler, 2003. "Managing the Euro," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 329-349, September.
  16. Florin O. Bilbiie, 2011. "The Time Inconsistency of Delegation-Based Time Inconsistency Solutions in Monetary Policy," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 657-674, September.
  17. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
  18. Crowe, Christopher, 2008. "Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 748-762, December.
  19. Kwabi, Frank O. & Boateng, Agyenim & Du, Min, 2020. "Impact of central bank independence and transparency on international equity portfolio allocation: A cross-country analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  20. Michael A. Gavin, 2020. "Independent central banks and banking crisis liquidity," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 109-131, January.
  21. Bodea, Cristina & Hicks, Raymond, 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 35-61, January.
  22. Beichen HUANG & Tianyang XI & Jiajun XU, 2020. "Contrôles et équilibres, leadership politique et autonomie bureaucratique : Constats au sujet des banques nationales de développement," Working Paper 6fb72d50-b8e9-40a3-9021-8, Agence française de développement.
  23. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  24. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  25. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  26. Udechukwu Ojiako & Tinashe Manungo & Max Chipulu & Johnnie Johnson, 2013. "The Impact of Regulation on Risk Perception: Evidence from the Zimbabwean Banking Industry," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 25(3), pages 276-288, September.
  27. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  28. Cristina Bodea & Raymond Hicks, 2018. "Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 340-365, November.
  29. Mr. Christopher W. Crowe, 2006. "Goal-Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate," IMF Working Papers 2006/256, International Monetary Fund.
  30. Zoe Venter, 2019. "The Role of Central Banks and the Political Environment in Financial Stability: A Literature Review," Working Papers REM 2019/89, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
  31. Kern, Andreas & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2019. "IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 212-229.
  32. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Haan, Jakob de, 2010. "When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 766-781, September.
  33. Bihari, Péter, 2017. "A jegybanki függetlenség és elszámoltathatóság a válság előtt és után [Independence and accountability of central banks before and after the global financial crisis]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 573-593.
  34. Roger Wettenhall, 2011. "Global Financial Crisis: The Australian Experience in International Perspective," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 77-91, March.
  35. Kenneth Scheve, 2003. "Public demand for low inflation," Bank of England working papers 172, Bank of England.
  36. Plümper, Thomas & Neumayer, Eric, 2011. "Fear of floating and de facto exchange rate pegs with multiple key currencies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 40052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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