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Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market Under Rate Regulation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  2. Martin Spindler & Joachim Winter & Steffen Hagmayer, 2014. "Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Germany," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 81(4), pages 781-801, December.
  3. Hsu, Yung-Ching & Shiu, Yung-Ming & Chou, Pai-Lung & Chen, Yen-Ming J., 2015. "Vehicle insurance and the risk of road traffic accidents," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 201-209.
  4. Bo Qu & Li Wei & Ping Wei, 2018. "An Empirical Investigation of Asymmetric Information in China’s Automobile Insurance Market," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 520-538, July.
  5. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
  6. Hao Zheng & Yi Yao & Yinglu Deng & Feng Gao, 2022. "Information asymmetry, ex ante moral hazard, and uninsurable risk in liability coverage: Evidence from China's automobile insurance market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(1), pages 131-160, March.
  7. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
  8. Hyojoung Kim & Doyoung Kim & Subin Im & James W. Hardin, 2009. "Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 343-366, June.
  9. Janko Gorter & Paul Schilp, 2012. "Risk preferences over small stakes: Evidence from deductible choice," DNB Working Papers 338, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  10. Alois Geyer & Daniela Kremslehner & Alexander Muermann, 2020. "Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Driving Behavior," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(4), pages 969-995, December.
  11. Ma, Yu-Luen & Zhu, Xiaoyu & Hu, Xianbiao & Chiu, Yi-Chang, 2018. "The use of context-sensitive insurance telematics data in auto insurance rate making," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 243-258.
  12. Philippe Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2009. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 73-86, February.
  13. David A. Cather, 2020. "Reconsidering insurance discrimination and adverse selection in an era of data analytics," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 45(3), pages 426-456, July.
  14. David A. Cather, 2018. "Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 21(2), pages 335-366, September.
  15. Paul Kofman & Gregory P. Nini, 2013. "Do Insurance Companies Possess an Informational Monopoly? Empirical Evidence From Auto Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 80(4), pages 1001-1026, December.
  16. UCHIDA Hirofumi & UESUGI Iichiro & IWAKI Hiromichi, 2017. "Adverse Selection versus Moral Hazard in Financial Contracting: Evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans," Discussion papers 17058, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  17. Saito Kuniyoshi & Kato Takaaki & Shimane Tetsuya, 2010. "Traffic Congestion and Accident Externality: A Japan-U.S. Comparison," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
  18. repec:mea:meawpa:12259 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Cannon, Edmund & Cipriani, Giam Pietro & Bazar-Rosen, Katia, 2014. "Surprising Selection Effects in the UK Car Insurance Market," IZA Discussion Papers 8172, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  20. Jing Ai & Lin Zhao & Wei Zhu, 2016. "Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers in Insurance Markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 41(2), pages 107-148, September.
  21. Shi, Peng & Valdez, Emiliano A., 2011. "A copula approach to test asymmetric information with applications to predictive modeling," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 226-239, September.
  22. Tomas J. Philipson & George Zanjani, 2013. "Economic Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty induced by Health Shocks: A Review and Extension," NBER Working Papers 19005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Shengkun Xie & Rebecca Luo & Yuanshun Li, 2022. "Exploring Industry-Level Fairness of Auto Insurance Premiums by Statistical Modeling of Automobile Rate and Classification Data," Risks, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-21, October.
  24. Jennifer L. Wang & Ching‐Fan Chung & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2008. "An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 551-566, September.
  25. Yarmukhamedov, Sherzod, 2013. "Empirical analysis of moral hazard: a study of a vehicle insurance tax reform," Working papers in Transport Economics 2013:14, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
  26. Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo Zeidan, 2010. "Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some empirical evidence," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 11(4), pages 413-418, August.
  27. Ciprian MatiÅŸ & Eugenia MatiÅŸ, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
  28. Chang, Vincent Y.L. & Hung, Kuo Ming & Wang, Kili C. & Yang, Sand, 2024. "Information asymmetry in reinsurance through various ceded contracts," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  29. Wei‐Jin Wu & Chu‐Shiu Li & Sheng‐Chang Peng, 2020. "The relationships between vehicle characteristics and automobile accidents," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 23(4), pages 331-377, December.
  30. Okura Mahito & Yoshizawa Takuya & Sakaki Motohiro, 2021. "An Evaluation of the New Japanese Bonus–Malus System with No-claim and Claimed Subclasses," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-12, January.
  31. Benjamin M. Blau, 2017. "Lobbying, political connections and emergency lending by the Federal Reserve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 333-358, September.
  32. Casper H. de Jong, 2021. "Risk classification and the balance of information in insurance; an alternative interpretation of the evidence," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 445-461, December.
  33. Wu, T.C. Michael & Yang, C.C., 2012. "The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2641-2645.
  34. ByBenjamin M. Blau & Todd G. Griffith & Ryan J. Whitby, 2022. "Lobbying and lending by banks around the financial crisis by," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(3), pages 377-397, September.
  35. Imen Karaa, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Learning in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market: New Evidence from Dynamic Data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 560-589, July.
  36. Christina Aperjis & Filippo Balestrieri, 2017. "Loss aversion leading to advantageous selection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 203-227, December.
  37. Fey, Jan-Christian & Schmeiser, Hato & Schreiber, Florian, 2024. "Optimal insurance deductibles under limited information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 202-221.
  38. Ben‐jiang Ma & Jing‐yu Ye & Yuan‐ji Huang & Muhammad Farhan Bashir, 2020. "Research of two‐period insurance contract model with a low compensation period under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(3), pages 293-307, April.
  39. repec:clg:wpaper:2007-18 is not listed on IDEAS
  40. Kremslehner, Daniela & Muermann, Alexander, 2016. "Asymmetric information in automobile insurance: Evidence from driving behavior," CFS Working Paper Series 543, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  41. Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Fiebig, Denzil G. & Jones, Glenn & Savage, Elizabeth, 2013. "Preference heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance: The case of Australia," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 757-767.
  42. J François Outreville, 2010. "The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(3), pages 484-497, July.
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