IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/eujhec/v11y2010i4p413-418.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some empirical evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Marcelo Resende
  • Rodrigo Zeidan

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo Zeidan, 2010. "Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some empirical evidence," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 11(4), pages 413-418, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:413-418
    DOI: 10.1007/s10198-010-0219-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10198-010-0219-5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10198-010-0219-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pauly, Mark V, 1986. "Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 629-675, June.
    2. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 1997. "Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 943-950, April.
    3. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466.
    4. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
    5. Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October.
    6. Kuniyoshi Saito, 2006. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market Under Rate Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 335-356, June.
    7. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2004. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 183-208, February.
    8. Takaaki Aoki, 2005. "Proposed modified probit model incorporating non-parametric density estimation: how to measure asymmetric information in the health insurance market?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(6), pages 347-350.
    9. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
    10. Wolfe, John R. & Goddeeris, John H., 1991. "Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 433-459.
    11. Gourieroux, Christian & Monfort, Alain & Renault, Eric & Trognon, Alain, 1987. "Generalised residuals," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 5-32.
    12. Pauly, Mark V., 1984. "Is cream-skimming a problem for the competitive medical market?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 87-95, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sayem Ahmed & Abdur Razzaque Sarker & Marufa Sultana & Sanchita Chakrovorty & Md. Zahid Hasan & Andrew J. Mirelman & Jahangir A. M. Khan, 2018. "Adverse Selection in Community Based Health Insurance among Informal Workers in Bangladesh: An EQ-5D Assessment," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-10, January.
    2. Bardey, David & Buitrago, Giancarlo, 2017. "Supplemental health insurance in the Colombian managed care system: Adverse or advantageous selection?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 317-329.
    3. Xia Du & Wei Zheng & Yi Yao, 2023. "The peer effect in adverse selection: Evidence from the micro health insurance market in Pakistan," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1063-1100, December.
    4. William Nganje & Kwame Asiam Addey, 2019. "Health Uninsurance in rural America: a partial equilibrium analysis," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 1-15, December.
    5. Stephen Kwasi Opoku Duku & Francis Asenso-Boadi & Edward Nketiah-Amponsah & Daniel Kojo Arhinful, 2016. "Utilization of healthcare services and renewal of health insurance membership: evidence of adverse selection in Ghana," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 1-12, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
    2. Jennifer L. Wang & Ching‐Fan Chung & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2008. "An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 551-566, September.
    3. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2008. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 303-350, April.
    5. Powell, David & Goldman, Dana, 2021. "Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 141-160.
    6. Renate Lange & Jörg Schiller & Petra Steinorth, 2017. "Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(1), pages 5-30, January.
    7. Kremslehner, Daniela & Muermann, Alexander, 2016. "Asymmetric information in automobile insurance: Evidence from driving behavior," CFS Working Paper Series 543, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    8. Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2006. "Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance," IFS Working Papers W06/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    9. Renate Lange & Jörg Schiller & Petra Steinorth, 2015. "Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 757, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    10. Kristian Bolin & Daniel Hedblom & Anna Lindgren & Bjorn Lindgren, 2010. "Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Voluntary Health Insurance in Europe," NBER Working Papers 15689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Tomas J. Philipson & George Zanjani, 2013. "Economic Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty induced by Health Shocks: A Review and Extension," NBER Working Papers 19005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Hyojoung Kim & Doyoung Kim & Subin Im & James W. Hardin, 2009. "Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 343-366, June.
    13. repec:mea:meawpa:12259 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark R. Cullen, 2010. "Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 877-921.
    15. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.
    16. K. P. M. Winssen & R. C. Kleef & W. P. M. M. Ven, 2017. "A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it, the lower your premium?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(2), pages 209-226, March.
    17. Alois Geyer & Daniela Kremslehner & Alexander Muermann, 2020. "Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Driving Behavior," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(4), pages 969-995, December.
    18. Sebastian Soika, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(1), pages 97-125, January.
    19. Bolhaar, Jonneke & Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2012. "A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 669-690.
    20. David M. Cutler & Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 157-162, May.
    21. Martin Spindler & Joachim Winter & Steffen Hagmayer, 2014. "Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Germany," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 81(4), pages 781-801, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; Health insurance market; D82; I11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:413-418. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.