Optimal insurance deductibles under limited information
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.026
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More about this item
Keywords
Optimal deductible choice; Limited information; Policyholder decision rules; Welfare economics;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Statistics
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