IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/bla/jfinan/v72y2017i6p2551-2588.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

How Do Quasi†Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk†Taking?

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Liu, Claire & Masulis, Ronald W. & Stanfield, Jared, 2021. "Why CEO option compensation can be a bad option for shareholders: Evidence from major customer relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 453-481.
  2. Ilona Babenko & Benjamin Bennett & John M Bizjak & Jeffrey L Coles & Jason J Sandvik, 2023. "Clawback Provisions and Firm Risk," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 191-239.
  3. Tan, Chunzhi & He, Chengying & Shi, Zhanzhong & Mo, Guoli & Geng, Xiaoxu, 2022. "How does CEO demission threat affect corporate risk-taking?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 935-944.
  4. Bienz, Carsten & Thorburn, Karin S. & Walz, Uwe, 2023. "Fund ownership, wealth, and risk-taking: Evidence on private equity managers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
  5. Arif, Salman & Donovan, John & Gopalan, Yadav & Morris, Arthur, 2024. "Pay for prudence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1).
  6. Pedro Gete & Juan Pedro Gómez, 2017. "Executive compensation and firm leverage. A policy oriented survey," Financial Stability Review, Banco de España, issue Spring.
  7. Karpavičius, Sigitas & Yu, Fan, 2019. "Managerial risk incentives and a firm’s financing policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 167-181.
  8. Peng, Juan & Huang, Wenli & Gao, Han & Wang, Hongli, 2022. "Modeling the unintended consequences of short selling for innovation investment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
  9. Daniel Beck & Gunther Friedl & Peter Schäfer, 2020. "Executive compensation in Germany," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 90(5), pages 787-824, June.
  10. Yin, Libo & Lu, Man, 2022. "Oil uncertainty and firms' risk-taking," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  11. Dunbar, Craig & Li, Zhichuan (Frank) & Shi, Yaqi, 2020. "CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  12. Çolak, Gönül & Korkeamäki, Timo, 2021. "CEO mobility and corporate policy risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  13. Han, Feng & Qin, Qi & Peabody, S. Drew, 2022. "Does incentive conflict between CEOs and CFOs benefit firms? Implications for corporate decision-making," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  14. Chang, Jeffery (Jinfan) & Meng, Qingbin & Ni, Xiaoran, 2022. "A tale of riskiness: The real effects of share pledging on the Chinese stock market," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  15. Islam, Emdad & Rahman, Lubna, 2023. "Shades of grey: Risk-related agency conflicts and corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  16. Zifeng Feng & William G. Hardin & Zhonghua Wu, 2024. "REIT Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Compensation in the New Era," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 651-681, November.
  17. Tao Chen & Li Zhang & Qifei Zhu, 2023. "Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(5), pages 1823-1857.
  18. Thorburn, Karin S & Bienz, Carsten & Walz, Uwe, 2019. "Ownership, wealth, and risk taking: Evidence on private equity fund managers," CEPR Discussion Papers 13944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Peter Koudijs & Laura Salisbury & Gurpal Sran, 2021. "For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Bank Risk in New England, 1867 to 1880," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1541-1599, June.
  20. Rajdeep Chakraborti & Sandeep Dahiya & Lei Ge & Pedro Gete, 2022. "Credit Stimulus, Executive Ownership, and Firm Leverage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7682-7700, October.
  21. Antoinette Schoar & Kelvin Yeung & Luo Zuo, 2020. "The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk," NBER Working Papers 27487, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Georges Dionne & Olfa Maalaoui Chun & Thouraya Triki, 2019. "The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(3), pages 247-277, September.
  23. Chesney, Marc & Stromberg, Jacob & Wagner, Alexander F. & Wolff, Vincent, 2020. "Managerial incentives to take asset risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  24. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
  25. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Jochem, Torsten & Rajamani, Anjana, 2020. "Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Gande, Amar & Kalpathy, Swaminathan, 2017. "CEO compensation and risk-taking at financial firms: Evidence from U.S. federal loan assistance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 131-150.
  27. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: A look at the numbers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  28. Pat Akey & Ian Appel, 2021. "The Limits of Limited Liability: Evidence from Industrial Pollution," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 5-55, February.
  29. Wruck, Karen H. & Wu, YiLin, 2021. "The relation between CEO equity incentives and the quality of accounting disclosures: New evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  30. F. M. Scherer, 2020. "Managerial Control and Executive Compensation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(2), pages 315-327, March.
  31. Fu, Xiaoxia & Wang, Shanshan & Jia, Jia, 2024. "Equity incentives and dynamic adjustments to corporate financialization: Evidence from Chinese A-share listed companies," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 948-966.
  32. Jeffrey L. Callen & Matthew R. Lyle, 2020. "The term structure of implied costs of equity capital," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 342-404, March.
  33. Jiang, Jiaoliang & Chen, Yulin, 2021. "How does labor protection influence corporate risk-taking? Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  34. Montinari, Natalia & Rancan, Michela, 2020. "A friend is a treasure: On the interplay of social distance and monetary incentives when risk is taken on behalf of others," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
  35. Zhaozhen Zhu & Yijia Guo & Zhao Jiang & Xiaojun Chen, 2023. "The Perspective of Long-Term and Short-Term Incentives on the Business Environment, Executive Incentive Contracts, and Enterprise Innovation," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(4), pages 21582440231, November.
  36. repec:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2017:i:5:p:1805-1846. is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Zhu, Chunhui & Zhang, Teng & Li, Shaoyu, 2021. "Why more restricted stocks, less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  38. Bloomfield, Matthew J., 2021. "Compensation disclosures and strategic commitment: Evidence from revenue-based pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 620-643.
  39. Huang, Yin-Siang & Lee, Cheng-Few & Lin, Chih-Yung, 2023. "Applications of fixed effect models to managerial risk-taking incentives," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 249-261.
  40. Scott D. Graffin & Timothy D. Hubbard & Dane M. Christensen & Eric Y. Lee, 2020. "The influence of CEO risk tolerance on initial pay packages," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 788-811, April.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.