IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v68y2022i10p7682-7700.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Credit Stimulus, Executive Ownership, and Firm Leverage

Author

Listed:
  • Rajdeep Chakraborti

    (IE Business School, IE University, 28006 Madrid, Spain)

  • Sandeep Dahiya

    (Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business, Washington, District of Columbia 20057)

  • Lei Ge

    (Renmin University of China, Haidian District, Beijing 100872, China)

  • Pedro Gete

    (IE Business School, IE University, 28006 Madrid, Spain)

Abstract

We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected Chinese credit expansion in 2008. This setting offers a unique advantage as in 2008 the Chinese government had almost complete control over the banking sector and it directed the banks to increase credit supply. Thus, in this setting, demand, rather than supply, largely drives the observed changes in firms’ borrowing. We provide extensive robustness tests to validate our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajdeep Chakraborti & Sandeep Dahiya & Lei Ge & Pedro Gete, 2022. "Credit Stimulus, Executive Ownership, and Firm Leverage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7682-7700, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:10:p:7682-7700
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4188
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4188
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4188?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kai Li & Tan Wang & Yan-Leung Cheung & Ping Jiang, 2011. "Privatization and Risk Sharing: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(7), pages 2499-2525.
    2. Ivo Welch, 2004. "Capital Structure and Stock Returns," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 106-131, February.
    3. Piotroski, Joseph D. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2014. "Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 111-136.
    4. Qi Chen & Xiao Chen & Katherine Schipper & Yongxin Xu & Jian Xue, 2012. "The Sensitivity of Corporate Cash Holdings to Corporate Governance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(12), pages 3610-3644.
    5. Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, 2016. "Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 669-691, April.
    6. Firth, Michael & Lin, Chen & Wong, Sonia M.L., 2008. "Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 642-653, December.
    7. repec:oup:ecpoli:v:26:y:2011:i:66:p:135-182 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Milidonis, Andreas & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos, 2014. "Managerial Incentives, Risk Aversion, and Debt," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 453-481, April.
    9. Erwan Morellec & Boris Nikolov & Norman Schürhoff, 2012. "Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 803-848, June.
    10. Vasia Panousi & Dimitris Papanikolaou, 2012. "Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 1113-1148, June.
    11. Yongheng Deng & Randall Morck & Jing Wu & Bernard Yeung, 2015. "China’s Pseudo-monetary Policy," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 55-93.
    12. Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, 2017. "How do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?," NBER Working Papers 23091, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Carr Bettis & John Bizjak & Jeffrey Coles & Swaminathan Kalpathy, 2010. "Stock and Option Grants with Performance-based Vesting Provisions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(10), pages 3849-3888, October.
    14. Gambacorta, Leonardo & Shin, Hyun Song, 2018. "Why bank capital matters for monetary policy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PB), pages 17-29.
    15. Vasso Ioannidou & Steven Ongena & José-Luis Peydró, 2015. "Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 95-144.
    16. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Itay Goldstein, 2011. "Self-fulfilling Credit Market Freezes," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(11), pages 3519-3555.
    17. Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, 1999. "Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 519-546, April.
    18. Li, Kai & Yue, Heng & Zhao, Longkai, 2009. "Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 471-490, September.
    19. Sandeep Dahiya & Giuliano Iannotta & Marco Navone, 2017. "Firm Opacity Lies in the Eye of the Beholder," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 553-592, September.
    20. Roni Michaely & Michael R. Roberts, 2012. "Corporate Dividend Policies: Lessons from Private Firms," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(3), pages 711-746.
    21. Conyon, Martin J. & He, Lerong, 2011. "Executive compensation and corporate governance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1158-1175, September.
    22. Liao, Li & Liu, Bibo & Wang, Hao, 2014. "China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 500-518.
    23. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    24. Kelly Shue & Richard R. Townsend, 2017. "How Do Quasi†Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk†Taking?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(6), pages 2551-2588, December.
    25. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug & Oliver Spalt, 2010. "Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2015-2050, December.
    26. Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi & Lemmon, Michael & Luo, Mi & Schallheim, James, 2005. "An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 435-461, November.
    27. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Luc Laeven & Gustavo A. Suarez, 2017. "Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(2), pages 613-654, April.
    28. Leonardo Gambacorta & David Marques-Ibanez, 2011. "The bank lending channel: lessons from the crisis [Financial intermediaries and monetary economics]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 26(66), pages 135-182.
    29. Michael L. Lemmon & Michael R. Roberts & Jaime F. Zender, 2008. "Back to the Beginning: Persistence and the Cross‐Section of Corporate Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1575-1608, August.
    30. Sumit Agarwal & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Neale Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, 2018. "Do Banks Pass through Credit Expansions to Consumers Who want to Borrow?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(1), pages 129-190.
    31. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
    32. Huang, Guihai & Song, Frank M., 2006. "The determinants of capital structure: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 14-36.
    33. Lin William Cong & Haoyu Gao & Jacopo Ponticelli & Xiaoguang Yang, 2019. "Credit Allocation Under Economic Stimulus: Evidence from China," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(9), pages 3412-3460.
    34. Ferris, Stephen P. & Hanousek, Jan & Shamshur, Anastasiya & Tresl, Jiri, 2018. "Asymmetries in the Firm's use of debt to changing market values," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 542-555.
    35. Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 693-714, September.
    36. Ouyang, Min & Peng, Yulei, 2015. "The treatment-effect estimation: A case study of the 2008 economic stimulus package of China," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 188(2), pages 545-557.
    37. Agarwal, Sumit & Ben-David, Itzhak, 2018. "Loan prospecting and the loss of soft information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 608-628.
    38. Ing-Haw Cheng & Harrison Hong & José A. Scheinkman, 2015. "Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(2), pages 839-879, April.
    39. Lynnette D. Purda, 2007. "Stock Market Reaction To Anticipated Versus Surprise Rating Changes," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 30(2), pages 301-320, June.
    40. Mariassunta Giannetti & Guanmin Liao & Xiaoyun Yu, 2015. "The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: Evidence from China," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1629-1682, August.
    41. Li Liao & Bibo Liu & Hao Wang, 2011. "Information Discovery in Share Lockups: Evidence from the Split‐Share Structure Reform in China," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 1001-1027, December.
    42. Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A Kim, 2020. "Corporate Governance in China: A Survey [The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 733-772.
    43. Glover, Brent & Levine, Oliver, 2015. "Uncertainty, investment, and managerial incentives," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 121-137.
    44. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate & Jon Yan, 2011. "Overconfidence and Early‐Life Experiences: The Effect of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1687-1733, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chakraborti, Rajdeep & Dahiya, Sandeep & Ge, Lei & Gete, Pedro, 2024. "A model of managerial compensation, firm leverage and credit stimulus," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chakraborti, Rajdeep & Dahiya, Sandeep & Ge, Lei & Gete, Pedro, 2024. "A model of managerial compensation, firm leverage and credit stimulus," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    2. Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A Kim, 2020. "Corporate Governance in China: A Survey [The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 733-772.
    3. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    4. Li, Bo & Megginson, William L. & Shen, Zhe & Sun, Qian, 2019. "Privatization effect versus listing effect: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 369-394.
    5. Liu, Jinyu & Wang, Zhengwei & Zhu, Wuxiang, 2021. "Does privatization reform alleviate ownership discrimination? Evidence from the Split-share structure reform in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    6. Pedro Gete & Juan Pedro Gómez, 2017. "Executive compensation and firm leverage. A policy oriented survey," Financial Stability Review, Banco de España, issue Spring.
    7. Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2018. "A Review of China’s Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 13269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Huacheng Wang & Kangtao Ye & Kai Zhong, 2018. "Accounting research in China: commemorating the 40th anniversary of reform and opening up," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-37, December.
    9. Jiandong Chen & Douglas Cumming & Wenxuan Hou & Edward Lee, 2016. "CEO Accountability for Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 138(4), pages 787-806, November.
    10. Daniel Beck & Gunther Friedl & Peter Schäfer, 2020. "Executive compensation in Germany," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 90(5), pages 787-824, June.
    11. Talavera, Oleksandr & Yin, Shuxing & Zhang, Mao, 2024. "Political motives of excess leverage in state firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    12. Albertazzi, Ugo & Barbiero, Francesca & Marqués-Ibáñez, David & Popov, Alexander & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza & Vlassopoulos, Thomas, 2020. "Monetary policy and bank stability: the analytical toolbox reviewed," Working Paper Series 2377, European Central Bank.
    13. Choi, Dong Beom & Eisenbach, Thomas M. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2021. "Watering a lemon tree: Heterogeneous risk taking and monetary policy transmission," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    14. Yang Zhao & Cheng Few Lee & Min-Teh Yu, 2024. "Does Equity Market Timing have a Persistent Impact on Capital Structure? Evidence from China," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Cheng Few Lee & Alice C Lee & John C Lee (ed.), Handbook of Investment Analysis, Portfolio Management, and Financial Derivatives In 4 Volumes, chapter 11, pages 363-397, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    15. Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc & Sun, Sunny Li, 2015. "The political determinants of executive compensation: Evidence from an emerging economy," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 69-91.
    16. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan, 2020. "Determinants and consequences of tournament incentives: A survey of the literature in accounting and finance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    17. Zhang, Shanshan & Liu, Chang, 2020. "State ownership and the structuring of lease arrangements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    18. Jiang, Fuxiu & Jiang, Zhan & Kim, Kenneth A., 2020. "Capital markets, financial institutions, and corporate finance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    19. Fang, Hongyan & Song, Zhihui & Nofsinger, John R. & Wang, Yuyue, 2017. "Trading restrictions and firm dividends: The share lockup expiration experience in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 83-98.
    20. Liu, Claire & Masulis, Ronald W. & Stanfield, Jared, 2021. "Why CEO option compensation can be a bad option for shareholders: Evidence from major customer relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 453-481.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:10:p:7682-7700. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.